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The sometimes-divergent mission of the USAF and US SOCOM has strained the 
ability of USAF Special Tactics (ST) to meet the operational demands of each.  The 
thesis will determine if USAF Special Tactics (ST) can better meet the operational 
requirements of both the USAF and USSOCOM.   
This is not a manpower study but a study of the readiness training required to 
support the ST operational mission.  The thesis identifies ST requirements as the 
capability to perform its core competencies, Terminal Control, Recovery, and 
Reconnaissance, and their nine associated core tasks.  This thesis will quantify the 
Training Time Required (TTR) and the Training Time Allotted (TTA) to accomplish the 
minimum essential training required to meet ST operational demands.  
Although the TTR to meet this demand exceeds the TTA, there are strategies 
available to deal with this training shortfall.  With an improved readiness system in place 
ST can be more prepared to meet the operational demands of both the USAF and 
SOCOM.  Choices must be made to implement a readiness system that best prepares for 
operational requirements, encourages innovative approaches, and maintains the flexibility 
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I.  INTRODUCTION   
A. BACKGROUND  
U.S. Air Force Special Tactics is in a unique position to operationally support 
both the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).  Special 
Tactics must overcome obstacles to effectively support both.  First, it must overcome the 
divergence of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). 
Second, it must employ a refined approach to combat readiness.  Sub-optimal 
organization has strained the ability of Special Tactics to meet operational requirements.  
Although some overlap exists between Air Force and SOCOM mission, this divergence 
may continue.  Special Tactics has been stretched thin to meet the operational 
requirements of each.  
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if USAF Special Tactics (ST) can meet 
the sometimes divergent operational requirements of the both the USAF and USSOCOM.   
This research will determine whether or not Special Tactics requires a different approach 
to readiness to better meet the operational requirements of the Air Force and SOCOM.   
In 1980, the experience at Dessert One during Operation Eagle Claw resulted in 
critical examination of U.S. special operations capability.  The Holloway commission 
identified the need for full integration of Air Force special operations during these special 
operation type missions (Rescue Mission Report).  Combat Control Teams (CCT) began 
to move aggressively in that direction.  
When Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) formed on May 22, 
1990, many questions were left unanswered.  CCT capabilities that existed in the Air 
Force were removed and placed entirely under the control of AFSOC.  Special Tactics 
Squadrons (STS), comprised of Combat Controllers and Pararescuemen (PJ), emerged as 
a key component in Special Operations arena.  Special Tactics is still likely tasked 
against operational war plans based on conventional Air Force capabilities.  However, a 
problem may exist because ST has also become an integral link in the air-to-ground 
interface for many SOCOM missions. 
From October 2001 through March of 2002 Special Tactics operators exhibited an 
amazing asymmetric impact during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  Special 
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Operations Forces (SOF), touted as having a leveraged impact during combat operations, 
were acknowledged for their leading role during OEF.  Special Tactics further 
exemplifies this asymmetric impact.  Special Tactics operators constitute only 3.6% of 
AFSOC forces.  ST is merely eight tenths of one percent of US SOCOM.  However 
during OEF operations up to Operation Anaconda, which began in early March, Special 
Tactics was responsible for control of 85 % of all air strike missions (Hutton).  ST 
orchestrated air assets throughout the battlespace using fire support, terminal control, and 
airspace control measures.  ST integrated the entire spectrum of aircraft weaving together 
their capabilities including attack profiles, airspeeds, altitudes, loiter times, munitions 
effectiveness and Probability of Incapacitation (PI), communications, and sensor 
capabilities to maximize the effectiveness of air power.  The ST operator acted as the 
human CPU integrating the Air Order of Battle (AOB) with the Ground Order of Battle 
(GOB).  This role undeniably indicates the leveraged impact ST can have during wartime 
operations. 
ST proved its asymmetrical impact involving airfield operations, Personnel 
Recovery (PR), trauma medicine, force protection, coalition support and integration, and 
as the vital link in the air-to-ground interface.  ST was critical to initial theater access and 
control of vital aerodromes.  ST was responsible for 100% of the 21 tactical airfield 
surveys ensuring theater access.  U.S. and coalition forces operated from 15 separate 
austere or expeditionary airfields in three countries throughout the region.  ST controlled 
100% of these airfields until relief of Combat Controllers by follow on forces began in 
the middle of January 2002 (Hutton).  The impact of the first ever combat employment of 
the Mobile Microwave Landing System (MMLS) should not be underestimated.  Because 
Afghanistan is a landlocked country with limited secure land routes, virtually all 
infiltration and resupply of forces was accomplished by airlift.  ST enabled continuous 
airlift operations, day and night, controlling over eight thousand sorties during all 
conditions including low visibility and Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC).  
The impact of failed airlift operations would have severely damaged OEF effectiveness. 
In addition, ST Combat Controllers and Pararescueman were involved in at least 
five major rescue and recovery operations.  The disproportionate impact of a good faith 
effort to ensure the well being of stranded, injured, or wounded U.S. and coalition forces 
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including friendly Afghani forces is indisputable.  Pararescueman saved lives and flew on 
100% of all airborne operations through February of 2002 (Hutton).  This rescue, 
recovery and battlefield trauma capability acted as a visible insurance policy against the 
unavoidable friction of war  
Unfortunately the total manning authorized for Combat Controllers and 
Pararescuemen has remained at virtually the same level for the past 25 years.  The actual 
manning of authorized positions is presently about 74% for Combat Controllers and 
approximately 80% for ST Pararescuemen (Scott). Special Tactics has set lofty goals for 
its teams.  Special Tactics mentality is to focus on quality at the expense of quantity if 
necessary.  Special Tactics continues to strive to accomplish many missions even while it 
is severely undermanned. ST operational requirements have increased over the last two 
decades.  Not only have mission requirements expanded, mission complexity has driven 
the range of required skills wider and wider. 
As the Air Force evolves, Special Tactics is uniquely postured to support Air 
Force operational requirements.  According to Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7, Air 
Force Special Operations, “First and foremost, AFSOF are airmen who bring a distinct 
perspective in the precise application of aerospace capabilities in support of both Air 
Force and special operations forces (SOF) missions” (AFDD 2-7, p. 1).  The relevance of 
Special Tactics to the Air Force and SOCOM is directly tied to the close relationship 
maintained with the parent service.  If Special Tactics is to remain a viable force enabler, 
it must maintain a close tie with the Air Force as that force evolves.  Special Tactics must 
continue to bring with it the necessary airmanship skills and unique integrated 
perspective in order to contribute to SOCOM’s various missions.   
A clear delineation of specific Special Tactics roles and requirements is needed.  
A balance must be struck with regards to how ST will support each component.  As a 
high demand and low-density careerfield ST cannot afford to be unprepared for 
operational requirements.  
B. SPECIAL TACTICS OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
What are the ST operational requirements?  The generic ST unit mission 
identification statement is contained within the 2001 STS Designated Operational 
Capability (DOC) statement.  The first requirement is,  “Fast reaction, rapidly deployable 
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force capable of establishing and providing positive control of the air/ground interface in 
defined objective area during special operations and/or conventional missions” (SORTS 
DOC, p. 1).  The second requirement, “Conducts reconnaissance, surveillance, 
assessment, and establishment of potential/selected assault zone sites, and 
positions/monitors terminal and en route navigational aids and target designation 
equipment” (p. 1).  The third ST requirement is, “Provides VFR and limited IFR air 
traffic control services, long-range secure command and control communications, and 
forward area refueling rearming points” (p.1).  The fourth ST mission requirement is, 
“Provides combat medical and trauma care, and establishes/operates casualty collection 
and transfer points.  Provides personnel recovery forces and mission management for 
conducting combat search and rescue, unconventional assisted recovery, and non-
combatant evacuation” (p. 1).  The final primary mission requirement is “Provides 
terminal attack control for close air support operations” (p. 1).  
Additional information regarding infiltration means and supplemental tasking is 
provided in the same DOC statement.  ST infiltration requirements are, “capable of 
employing by static line/HALO/HAHO parachute scuba, watercraft, all-terrain vehicles, 
or any other means available, day or night” (p. 3).  ST must also “remove obstacles from 
the objective area with demolitions, gather and report intelligence, and provide local 
weather observations” (p. 3).  In addition, ST “provides operational interface, orientation, 
and training for U.S. and allied personnel, including Foreign Internal Defense for Air 
Force Special Tactics operations and procedures” (p. 3).  A critical point contained in the 
final supplemental mission requirement is, “the unit may be tasked as augmentation 
forces” (p. 3). 
C. OBJECTIVE 
This thesis will not analyze the manpower required to support the operational 
requirements of the Air Force and SOCOM.  Rather it will study the readiness training 
required to support the ST operational mission.  It will not determine the number of ST 
operators required to support individual war plans.  This thesis will determine the training 
that is required of any ST operator that is expected to deploy in support of those plans.     
This thesis will examine the operational requirements placed on the Special 
Tactics careerfield.  The greatest challenge to each Special Tactics Squadron (STS) is to 
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maintain its operator’s combat readiness at the highest level feasible.  Each STS must be 
fully prepared to accomplish its stated mission and meet any mission it is tasked to 
accomplish.  Identifying only essential training is vital to accomplishing this goal.  Each 
squadron has compiled its Mission Essential Task Listing (METL).  The breadth and 
depth of training required to meet squadron METL’s is fairly daunting.  A detailed list of 
minimum essential training events is published in the current Air Force Special 
Operations Command Instruction (AFSOCI) 36-2204, Special Tactics Operator Training.  
The complexity of modern special operations and ST’s worldwide involvement in these 
missions requires proficient expertise of the highest level.   
This thesis will quantify the total Training Time Required (TTR) to accomplish 
the minimum essential training events.  Quantifying the TTR for training events will be 
based on the 720 STG input, the 1993 ST reengineering study, expert advice from various 
sources, squadron input, and personal experience.  Although this method leaves room for 
error or disagreement, the most accurate, fair, and impartial judgments will be made.  A 
set standard will be applied to maintain consistency within this judgment process.   
The thesis will also attempt to accurately estimate the Training Time Allotted 
(TTA) for operational training.  Operational training is defined in Joint Publication 1-02, 
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as “Training that develops, 
maintains, or improves the operational readiness of individuals or units” (Joint 
Publication 1-02, p. 318).  The method used to estimate the TTA for operational training 
involves a simple formula. First, the 720 STG Special Tactics Tasking Allocation System 
(STTAS) is used to identify operator availability.  Each squadron must provide the 720 
STG with a percentage of its manpower.  Presently the Group requires 60 percent of each 
squadron’s operator manpower.  In essence, this means that the squadron only owns 40 
percent of its time.  It is during this 40 percent that all essential individual an unit training 
must be accomplished.  Although some operational training might be accomplished 
during the Group’s time, the squadron should not include this time when considering 
training to meet squadron METL’s.  In addition, operators are expected to be trained, and 
ready to accomplish operational missions during the time allotted to 720 STG.  In other 
words, operators are required to be proficient in the necessary skills during this period of 
“Group control”.   
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The second feature used to determine the training time allotted is the 1996 Air 
Force Manpower Availability Factor (MAF).  For the purpose of this thesis, the MAF is 
used to help determine how much actual training time exists during the period the 
squadron controls METL training.   
D. SCOPE 
The primary focus is on Special Tactics operational readiness.  Joint Pub 1-02 
defines operational readiness as, “The capability of a unit/formation, ship, weapon 
system, or equipment to perform the mission or functions for which it is organized or 
designed” (318).  Readiness measures the ability of a military unit to accomplish its 
assigned missions. The Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) produces unit 
“C-levels” that capture the proportion of the wartime mission the unit can perform.  
Personnel readiness is one factor used to measure overall unit readiness.  In addition, 
material readiness and unit training are used to measure the unit readiness.  Research in 
1997 by RAND indicated that, “Personnel Readiness is comprised of five attributes—
available, qualified, experienced, stable, and motivated—are necessary and sufficient for 
measuring and predicting personnel readiness” (Schank, p. 9).   This thesis will focus 
primarily on one of the above factors, qualified.  Although the other factors are also 
crucial ingredients to combat readiness, they are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
According to Schank, personnel readiness is the building block of the overall readiness of 
the unit (p. 6).  This work focuses on personnel readiness because gaining and 
maintaining qualified and current personnel in required tasks is the major ST obstacle.   
It might be argued that having the necessary equipment is useless when personnel 
are not available and trained to employ that equipment.  The ST bottleneck or limiting 
factors seems to be manpower and the ST readiness/training process.  Increasing the 
number of manned ST billets will not alleviate the problem without a focused training 
system in place.  Therefore, the primary focus of this work is on the system used to 
define, achieve, and maintain readiness.  
The 720 Special Tactics Group (STG), based at Hurlburt Air Field, Florida, has 
made some significant changes.  A long-term concerted effort is underway to increase the 
percentage of manned ST billets.  The 720 STG recently implemented a new program to 
increase the percentage of manned ST operator billets.  The ST Advanced Skills Training 
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(AST) program takes control of a process previously owned by the Air Education and 
Training Command (AETC).  AFSOC and the 720 STG felt they could improve the 
quality of training and increase the total number of operators qualified per year, if 
AFSOC owned the process.  The objective of the AST program is to provide Special 
Tactics Squadrons with combat ready 5-level operators.  According to AFSOCI 36-2204, 
Special Tactics Operator Training,  “A 5-level must be able to accomplish unsupervised 
performance of low to medium complexity tasks and supervised performance of medium 
to high complexity tasks” (AFSOCI, p. 11).  The squadron must then take this 5-level 
operator, maintain his currency, build his proficiency, begin his upgrade process, and 
program for his advanced training.  In conjunction with AST, an improved training and 
readiness system is needed to raise the level of combat readiness throughout the ST 
careerfield.   
In the long term, AST should provide more ST operators to the squadrons.  
However, without improving the ST readiness training process, the squadrons will face 
severe training challenges.  This situation might result in a situation where AST produces 
more operators but they continue to be trained to an insufficient level once assigned to a 
squadron.  If ST operator manning increases and the present readiness system remains in 
place, combat readiness will not be maximized.  The level of pain might be spread 
throughout a larger pool.  However, with an inefficient readiness training process in place 
there remains a significant risk of encountering an operational readiness shortfall.   
A goal of this thesis is to identify how to improve overall readiness without 
necessarily having to increase manpower. ST can be better prepared to accomplish its 
mission with the present level of manning.  The way to accomplish this objective is to 
develop a readiness system that maximizes the effect of focused training.  If or when the 
AST begins to produce more 5-Level operators, the improved ST readiness training 
system will be in place to integrate a greater number of operators and maintain their 
combat readiness.   
Some limitations were encountered in the course of researching this thesis.  
Special Tactics has only been in formal existence since 1990.   The amount of published 
material is limited.  Without fully exploring the reasons for the lack of documentation, a 
cursory look indicates that its relative size, security concerns, the continuous pace of ST 
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operations, and limited manpower to actually accomplish formal documentation are all 
contributing factors.  The amount of historical numerical and factual data on ST 
deployments, training system, and operations tempo are also insufficient.  In addition, 
limited work has been published concerning this readiness problem.   
Studies accomplished by the Air Force approach manpower and combat readiness 
from a completely different viewpoint.  Traditionally manpower studies have approached 
manning by defining what must be accomplished.  For instance, A-10 aircraft 
maintenance must be accomplished.  Each A-10 aircraft requires X hours of maintenance 
per month.  Each Air Force maintainer works 160 hours per month.  Therefore the 
manning required per aircraft is determined by a formula: X maintenance hours required 
per aircraft per month divided by 160 man-hours per month equals Y number of aircraft 
maintainers; (X / 160 = Y).  The A-10 squadron has 30 assigned aircraft.  Therefore the 
squadron’s aircraft maintenance manpower is set at 30 times Y.   
Unfortunately this formula does not work for ST manpower nor does it translate 
into operational readiness.  The ST operator is more like the weapon system.  The 
weapon system requires X hours of maintenance per month to keep it operational.  The 
ST operator requires a given amount of training to keep him operational.  As a matter of 
fact, ST operators are technically classified as a weapon system (Oeser).   
A 1999 RAND study asserts that, “Readiness depends on the unit’s access to 
resources (personnel and equipment) and to processes (training and maintenance) needed 
to keep these resources combat- ready”  (Cook, p. 35).  The ST operator requires specific 
training to maintain his combat readiness.  Identifying whom to train, what task to train 
for, and when to train for that task is the issue at hand.  These decisions comprise the 
processes needed to keep the operator combat ready. 
E. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY 
The literature on the subject of combat readiness does acknowledge the adverse 
affects of the high operations tempo.  It appears that the high demand for Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) will continue, if not increase.  Many approaches to improve ST 
combat readiness have been undertaken.  Instead of focusing on improving ST 
manpower, this thesis will attempt to improve Special Tactics’ approach to readiness. 
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The methodology was kept as simple as possible.  The methodology employed in 
this thesis is comprised of six steps.  Step one; determine what is required of ST.  Step 
two; quantify the Training Time Required (TTR) to meet said requirements.  Step three; 
determine how much time is available to train for the established requirements.  Training 
Time Allotted (TTA) is the quantified sum of time allotted for training.  Step four; 
compare the two, is TTA < or > TTR.  Step five; identify alternatives to the ST approach 
to requirements and training.  Step six; make recommendations concerning approaches to 
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II. SPECIAL TACTICS OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING 
REQUIREMENTS 
This chapter will provide a layman’s definition of the ST mission.  The chapter 
also identifies the tools used to operationally task ST.  A simple description of Mission 
Essential Task Listing (METL) development is then provided.   This chapter describes 
ST’s contribution to AFSOC’s mission.  These contributions drive training requirements.  
The chapter describes the process the commander uses to identify these training 
requirements, its METL, to ensure his unit is prepared to accomplish it’s assigned 
mission.   The chapter then presents a spreadsheet designed to quantify the Training Time 
Required (TTR) to meet the METL.  A minimum set of training tasks has been developed 
by the 720 STG to support the generic ST METL.  This spreadsheet is a direct 
representation of these minimum training tasks.  
A. SPECIAL TACTICS MISSION 
The layman’s definition is one that those outside ST will understand.  Joint 
Publication 1-02 defines a Special Tactics Team (STT) as,    
An Air Force team composed primarily of special operation combat 
control and pararescue personnel.  The team supports joint SO by 
selecting, surveying, and establishing assault zones; providing assault zone 
terminal guidance and air traffic control; conducting direct action 
missions; providing medical care and evacuation; and coordinating, 
planning, and conducting air, ground, and naval fire support operations. 
This is the definition most often used to gain an initial understanding of ST.  
Those knowledgeable about the ST mission would add, “The USAF STT are weapon 
systems that are vital to the delivery of air power and to theater and joint task force 
commanders” (Strategic Planning Process, p. 1).  Additional clarification would add, 
“The STT also links air power customers to vital capabilities such as weather analysis 
and rescue” (p.1). 
The Department of Defense’s deliberate planning system produces various plans 
to meet the national military strategy.  These plans include Operational Plans 
(OPLAN’s), Functional Plans (FUNCPLAN’s), Concept Plans (CONPLAN’s), and 
Theater Engagement Plans (TEP’s). (JFSC PUB, p. 4-26).   In essence, all ST operational 
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requirements flow from these plans and any applicable external directives.  External 
directives usually consist of various supporting plans such as mobilization plans, mission 
training plans, force integration plans, installation wartime transition and deployment 
plans. (FM-25-100, p. 2-1) 
B. MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LISTING DEVELOPMENT   
Each commander identifies the war plans and external directives that apply to his 
unit. The commander then exercises his judgment and analysis to produce Mission 
Essential Tasks (MET).  The tasks are compiled creating the Mission Essential Task 
Listing (METL).  The commander has the responsibility for developing a training 
strategy that will maintain unit proficiency for all tasks that have been designated as 
mission essential.   “There should be no attempt to prioritize tasks within the METL.  By 
definition, all tasks that have been placed on the METL are equally essential to ensure 
mission accomplishment” (FM25-100, p. 2-1).   
The METL is the commanders guiding document to maintain focus on the 
primary task at hand, combat readiness.  The limited size of ST precipitates a precise 
approach to readiness training.  This is articulated clearly in AFDD 2-7, “Economy of 
force requires clearly articulated objectives, priorities, and a disciplined strategy-to-task 
approach to planning”  (AFDD 2-7, p. 6).  The 720 STG developed clear ST objectives 
and priorities.  It also designed a strategy to task approach articulated in AFSOCI 36-
2204.   
C. SPECIAL TACTICS CORE COMPETENCIES 
The ST core competencies are a function of the AFSOC mission areas.  AFSOC 
mission areas are a function of the overall Air Force core competencies and U.S. 
SOCOM’s primary missions.  The six Air Force core competencies are:  Air and Space 
Superiority, Information Superiority, Global Attack, Precision Engagement, Rapid Global 
Mobility, Agile Combat Support.   
The nine primary SOCOM missions are:  Counter proliferation (CP), Combating 
Terrorism (CT), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct 
Action (DA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Civil Affairs (CA), Unconventional 
Warfare (UW), Information Operations (IO).  AFSOC derived five mission areas from 
these six core competencies and nine primary missions.  The five AFSOC mission areas 
13 
are:  Precision Employment/Strike, Information Operations, Air Force Special Operations 
Forces (AFSOF) Mobility, Shaping the Battlespace, and Agile Combat Support (AFDD 
2-7, p. 15).   
The 720 STG has identified three core ST competencies:  Terminal Control, 
Recovery, and Reconnaissance.  These three core competencies are supported by three 
core tasks.  Air Traffic Control (ATC), Terminal Attack Control (TAC), and austere 
airfield operations are three core tasks that support the Terminal Control core 
competency.  The following core tasks support the ST recovery core competency, 
Personnel Recovery (PR), equipment recovery, and battlefield trauma medicine.  The 
three core tasks that support the reconnaissance core competency are surveys and 
assessment, weather forecasting, and Special Reconnaissance (SR). 
Figure 1 on the following page illustrates how the Air Force core competencies 
and SOCOM primary missions are integrated into the five AFSOC mission areas.  The 
three ST core competencies are derived from these mission areas.  Finally, the nine core 
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Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7, Air Force Special Operations, illustrates 
numerous ways ST contributes to the five AFSOC mission areas.  This document is 
crucial to acknowledgement of AFSOC’s role within the Air Force.  The combination of 
doctrine, training, and organization is vital to every unit’s battlefield capabilities (Tellis, 
2000).  As with all doctrine, AFDD 2-7 directly contributes to the training, organization, 
and employment of ST on the battlefield.  It describes how ST contributes to precision 
employment/strike mission area.  “AFSOF precision employment/strike ground elements 
and airborne platforms provide all weather weapons delivery and support (target 
designation, air traffic control, and drop zone and landing zone operations) across the full 
spectrum of conflict” (AFDD 2-7, p. 16).    
This document later describes examples of how ST can contribute to IO.  
Specifically ST makes significant contributions to Information-in-Warfare by infiltrating, 
operating, maintaining, and exfiltrating a variety of ground-based sensors to provide 
various types of information.  This influential document goes on to state, “AFSOF 
contribution to rapid global mobility is not limited to aircraft but includes the key ground 
role played by STT’s…STT play an integral part in rapid global mobility. They are the 
dynamic link between the surface forces and the air assets that deliver, sustain, and 
recover them (AFDD 2-7,p. 21).    
ST is a vital ingredient in AFSOF’s contribution to the Air Force’s core 
competency of shaping the battlespace.  It accomplishes this through its forward presence 
and engagement.  The FID aspect of AFSOC’s mission is also acknowledged in AFDD 2-
7.  Examples of ST’s contribution to AFSOC’s fifth mission area, Agile combat support, 
is recognized as its capabilities involving rescue, medical support, air base defense, force 
protection, and weather support.  It is from the above five AFSOC mission areas that the 
three ST core competencies flow.    
D. 720 STG TRAINING INSTRUCTION 
The METL developed by the 720 STG is the product of its wartime taskings, 
external directives and the application of commander’s judgment.  The commander 
developed and implemented a training strategy to maintain ST proficiency.  The 720 STG 
recently produced an updated training instruction.  AFSOCI 36-2204 is the group’s 
16 
guidance for ST training. “This Instruction establishes the combat readiness training 
program for ST operators, publishes training philosophy, outlines training 
responsibilities, assigns and defines training events, and provides guidelines for planning, 
conducting, and documenting ST training” (AFSOCI 36-2204, p. 1).  The instruction is 
the basis used to examine ST training requirements.  The instruction directs specific 
training that must be accomplished.  A commander is expected to use this instruction as 
the “benchmark”.  The training events outlined in the instruction should be the basis of 
unit readiness training efforts and help measure the results of those efforts.  
Although the instruction specifies a minimum set of training events, the unit 
commanders may implement more demanding training criteria or additional training 
events.  Each unit’s METL contains tasks, conditions, and standards that more explicitly 
convey the commander’s intent.   The instruction directs each unit to develop lesson 
plans for unit-unique training requirements.  It also directs each unit to report against the 
published standard.   
AFSOCI 36-2204 describes the ST training program.  “The goal of realistic 
training is to increase proficiency on mission essential tasks until unit qualification is 
attained” (AFSOCI, p. 8).  Training as defined by the 720 STG is unit effort designed to 
increase proficiency and attain qualification (p. 8).  This instruction requires the unit to 
perform various practical training events.  “Practical events are directed by this 
instruction and support mission or enabling tasks.  Practical events are demonstrations of 
proficiency and the culmination of training.  It must be understood by all levels of 
leadership that many of the practical events are complex and will be the culmination of 
an extensive training effort” (p. 10).  Therefore, efforts to meet the minimum standard are 
left to the discretion of the unit.  Each unit develops and implements it own training 
program.  The training program must be developed to meet the minimum standards set 
forth in the group instruction but also any squadron unique MET’s.  These unique MET’s 
are contained in that squadron’s METL.   
The METL is an unconstrained statement of tasks required to accomplish wartime 
missions.  The METL is not constrained by resource availability.  If a commander 
determines his unit cannot execute all the tasks on the unit’s METL to standard, he must 
request an adjustment of the unit’s mission. (FM 25-101, p. 2-2) 
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E. MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS  
The 720 STG MET’s are a direct result of operational demands.  “The ST MET 
list is composed of three mission tasks that each break down into three collective task and 
five enabling tasks (IAW AFDD 1-1) that enable the mission to be accomplished” 
(AFSOCI 36-2204, p. 12).   The two overarching enabling tasks are Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I), and employment of defensive 
measures. Three additional ST enabling tasks are deploy, sustain and redeploy, mission 
preparation, and infiltrate/exfiltrate.  From the three core competencies flow the nine core 
ST tasks depicted near the bottom of figure 1.   
F. TRAINING TIME REQUIRED SPREADSHEET 
The 720 STG training office developed a list depicting the minimum required 
events to support the 720 STG METs.  This list is then combined with a media training 
template.  The resulting spreadsheet is termed the Training Time Required (TTR) 
Spreadsheet.  It is Appendix A to this thesis.  The TTR spreadsheet was developed for 
this thesis to estimate the time required to accomplish each event listed in AFSOCI 36-
2204.  The Spreadsheet is comprised of required events, either PJ events or CCT events.  
These are listed along the left side of the spreadsheet. Along the top of the spreadsheet 
are the various media available to accomplish the training.  The five media are: 
classroom, Air Traffic Control (ATC) simulator, practical exercise, Field Training 
Exercises (FTX), and Temporary Duty (TDY).  The classroom media is fairly self-
explanatory.  Each Special Tactics Squadron (STS) operationally controlled by the 720 
STG, maintains its own ATC simulator.  ATC simulator training is limited to six hours 
per day (TRSA, p. 43).   
Practical exercises are those that go beyond classroom or training devices.  They 
occur in an environmental setting.  The training is accomplished in a loosely controlled 
manner.  Hands-on performance is the primary consideration.  The pace of training is 
determined by the progress of the operators.  Practical exercise training is limited to 8 
hours per day.  It must be recognized that not all practical exercise training is considered 
a “practical event”.  Practical events are only those specifically listed in AFSOCI 36-
2204 as “practical” in the “Event” column on the TTR spreadsheet in Attachment A.   
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A Field Training Exercise (FTX) is used to accurately replicate a mission 
scenario.  The mission usually drives the training.  A complete mission profile is 
accomplished including mission planning, infiltration, actions on the objective, 
exfiltration, extraction, and debriefing (TSRA, p. 22).  The training is accomplished in 
field conditions and may require an overnight stay.  Each FTX contains 12 hours of 
training per day.  Many of the same events are contained in both the PJ and CCT 
spreadsheets.    
Also along the top section of the TTR spreadsheet there are the total hours 
estimated per training event.  In addition, the spreadsheet has column headings for 
SORTS and METL’s.  The SORTS column represents the percentage of qualified ST 
operators required as a minimum to report “T”, trained, for that event/category.  Along 
the bottom of the spreadsheet there are rows labeled Total hours per media and training 
days per media.  The training days per media is determined by the total hours per media 
divided by the hours in a given media training day.  For example, a day of ATC simulator 
training is limited to 6 hours.  Therefore, the training days in the ATC column of 
Appendix A are: 16 hours/6 hrs per day = 2.67 days.     
As mentioned in the introduction, the breadth of ST skills and required 
operational tasks are fairly daunting.  The minimum required training events for PJ 
training encompass 56 separate events.  Five of these events are considered practical 
events.  Practical events are directed by AFSOCI 36-2204 and support mission or 
enabling tasks.  As AFSOCI 36-2204 explains, these events may not be a single event.   
The practical event might be the final day of training which was arrived at only through 
previous training and complex preparation.  The estimation of training time required per 
event is a judgment call made by each squadron.  Often these PJ practical events require 
multiple performances in a given nine-month period.   
There are 80 separate events listed for CCT operators.  The CCT operator is 
required to perform 13 practical training events.  As with the PJ events, some CCT events 
require multiple iterations during a nine-month period.  It should be noted that many of 
the same events are required of both CCT and PJ’s.  For instance, both PJ’s and CCT 
operators are required as a minimum to perform a night tactical static line parachute jump 
two times during every nine-month period. 
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The above core tasks require intensive training not only to achieve qualification 
but also to maintain proficiency.  Due to the posture of ST and its SOF role, ST must be 
prepared to accomplish its mission world wide in nearly any environment.   Based on 
these requirements, the ST training instruction states, “The 720 STG/CC will ensure ST 
forces are trained to execute the following essential collective tasks and ensure they can 
conduct self-sustained ground combat operations for up to 72 hours worldwide in arctic, 
desert, jungle, mountainous, urban, and sea environments” (AFSOCI 36-2204, p. 12).   
The limited squadron size prevents that squadron from developing teams 
designated for specific environments.  For example, the 22 STS, located at McChord 
AFB Washington, cannot posture itself to maintain one team as its mountain team.  The 
squadron is prevented from designating one flight as its mountain team because that team 
cannot be protected from operational deployments.  If the unit is tasked with an 
operational mission requiring mountain skills and it’s designated mountain team is 
already deployed, the squadron would be unable to accomplish its assigned mission.  A 
squadron commander should not be prepared to accept this level of risk.  Therefore, the 
squadron must work to train enough operators in the mountain environment to 
accomplish that mission.  To carry this to its logical conclusion the squadron must 
maintain the ability meet mission tasking involving each environment in its area of 
operation including those listed above; arctic, mountainous, desert, jungle, urban, and 
sea.  Each STS has a primary area of operation, however due to the limited number of ST 
operators worldwide the squadrons are often tasked with mission in its secondary or 
tertiary area of operation. 
G. SPREADSHEET DISCUSSION 
The spreadsheet can be a useful tool to help understand the range and depth of 
skills required of the ST operator.  It does not provide an exact scientific quantification of 
the man-hours required to maintain each ST operator’s combat readiness.  It must be 
understood that the training environment within a Special Tactics Squadron (STS) is 
based on the team. The word “team” is an important holdover from the days prior to 
AFSOC consolidation when Combat Control Teams existed independently.  A team is 
described in traditional Air Force terminology as a flight.  This team/flight is usually 
comprised of 18 operators.  Usually combat readiness training is designed around the 
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team, its members, and its training shortfalls.  The problem with identifying training 
shortfalls is that each operator’s shortfalls will likely vary.  Some operators might be 
sufficiently trained in Small Unit Tactics (SMUT), while another operator may not have 
trained or accomplished SMUT for a year.  Therefore the team must build its training 
requirements based on its limiting factors, its least trained operators. 
The training status of ST operators varies based on the type of mission they have 
recently supported.  For instance, a given operator might have spent the last 90 days 
deployed performing the personnel recovery mission.  He may have been sitting ground 
alert with helicopter packages ready to launch.  Therefore his ATC skills would need 
enhancement, nearly all his infiltration skills would need to be trained, and most likely all 
other skills not directly related to the personnel recovery mission would require some 
improvement.  However, his teammate was deployed to a separate location to conduct 
austere airfield operations.  His ATC skills are polished but he needs to train on the 
personnel recovery mission and his infiltration/exfiltration means.  As you can see, 
Special Tactics Team (STT) combat readiness training must begin with the lowest 
common denominator and build from the bottom up.   
The spreadsheet shows the time input required to accomplish a training event.  
The estimates are good for planning considerations.  The times are estimates and not hard 
numbers etched in stone.  Historically, ST training has been modeled after the crawl, 
walk, then run concept.  Individual operators and teams might progress at different rates.  
We must also consider time to revisit unachieved training objectives and training 
shortfalls due to unavailable assets, weather, or other uncontrollable circumstances.  In 
essence, the spreadsheet is only as good as the estimates it contains.  With that said, the 
TTR spreadsheet is a useful tool to help gauge the training that can be accomplished in a 
given period of time.  It is useful in determining the time required to meet the minimum 
training objectives outlined in AFSOCI 36-2204.    
Attachment A contains a full listing of all required events.  In addition, this 
attachment contains an estimate of training time required for each individual event.  The 
56 separate PJ events will likely require 624.5  hours of training.  The 80 minimum 
required CCT events require 599.5 hours of training.   It must be recognized that these are 
the minimum required events.  The spreadsheet contains the generic training events 
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required by the 720 STG.  The times contained in the spreadsheet are based on the time 
required to complete an iteration of the given event.    
The times input into the TTR spreadsheet came from various sources.  The five 
sources that contributed to the spreadsheet are the 720 STG lesson plans, 720 STG 
experts, the 1993 ST reengineering study, the squadron operations staffs, and AST 
experts.  The order of precedence to resolve discrepancies follows the above listing.  The 
720 STG lesson plans were used for initial inputs.  These lesson plans were developed 
using leading experts from throughout the ST careerfield.  The lesson plans standardize 
training and quantify specific time required to accomplish a limited number of events.  
The 720 STG experts were then used to provide estimates when lesson plans did not exist 
for specific events.  The 1993 ST reengineering study was relied upon heavily for time 
inputs of practical events.  The 1993 study contained a detailed breakdown of time for 
specific practical events.  However, some practical events were not addressed in the 1993 
study.  If the 1993 study did not contain information regarding practical events, squadron 
inputs were solicited.  AST input was then incorporated for PJ specific events.  The AST 
instructors provided valuable input based on AST lesson plans and expert experience 
executing PJ combat readiness training.     
There are other considerations that must be addressed.  The requirement for an 
ATC practical is stated as, “Provide ATC service to fixed or rotary wing aircraft during 
multi-ship air and airland operations in a air traffic environment or simulator” (AFSOCI, 
p. 14).  A problem may arise when considering TTR.  According to retired Master 
Sergeant Al Avialo, a former Combat Controller with extensive austere airfield ATC 
experience and current ATC simulator operator, the average ATC practical takes 2 hours.  
Two hours are required to accomplish one ATC practical involving two CCT operators.  
An ATC practical is what we shall refer to as an individual training event.  If the event 
were accomplished as a team-training event, the time to accomplish the event would be 
much greater.  Given the calculations below, a single ATC training event would require 
three full days of training if it were scheduled as a team event.  Because the ATC 
simulator can only operate for six hours a day, only three ATC practical events can be 
accomplished per day.  Three ATC training events per day train a total of six Combat 
Controllers per day.  There are 18 Combat Controllers per team.  By the end of the third 
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day of training each Combat Controller will have met the requirement for one ATC 
training event.  Each Combat Controller can only log 2 hours in the ATC simulator over 
this three-day period.  However, while the ATC simulator is occupied, approximately 16 
other CCT operators are free to use their time as efficiently as possible to focus on ATC 
related activities or other training objectives while waiting for their time slot in the ATC 
simulator.    
The ATC practical event serves to identify a management consideration of 
individual versus team training events.  Individual and team events must be incorporated 
into the team’s training plan.  The goal is to maximize the effectiveness of the training.  
This consideration also comes into play for other training events.  These events are 
helicopter Call For Fire (CFF), Gunship CFF, and TAC.  The utilization of training is not 
maximized if all 18 operators attempt to accomplish the same event simultaneously.  
These events should be accomplished as a less than full flight strength event.  The TTR 
spreadsheet contains the time for an individual to accomplish the event.  It does not 
consider the time for an entire team of Combat Controllers or Pararescuemen to 
accomplish events that can be accomplished individually.  
The generic TTR spreadsheet does not account for the additional time required to 
meet the advanced qualifications.  These qualifications are Auto-CAD, free fall 
Jumpmaster (JM), static-line JM, helocast master, fastrope master, rappel master, tandem 
master, and dive supervisor.  Although a significant amount of time is required for 
upgrade and performance of these qualifications, no additional time is factored into the 
TTR spreadsheet.  These advanced qualifications should be accomplished during the 
training of the actual events.   
The individuals performing advanced qualification duties will likely be required 
to commit time in addition to the time estimated to accomplish the event. For instance, 
the static-line jumpmaster would likely spend time preparing for the training event after 
duty hours.  This would include such things as preparing a warning order, academic 
preparation, collecting meteorological data, and coordination with the flying squadron.  
Although the jumpmaster is required to perform these duties, as far as the TTR 
spreadsheet is concerned, he is not allocated time during the training day to do so.   
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The TTR spreadsheet merely contains the minimum required training events.  
Each unit will invariably have unique requirements.  A squadron’s regional orientation 
will likely influence the unique training requirements.  The training for these unique 
requirements might include things such as the Mobile Microwave Landing System 
(MMLS), Air Base Ground Defense, non-combatant evacuation operations, Air 
Expeditionary Force integration, Lead Mobility Wing, or Contingency Response Group 
interoperability.  Each unit has the ability to add to the group’s required minimum 
training events.  These squadron unique requirements are above and beyond what is 
conveyed in the TTR spreadsheet.     
H. SUMMARY  
This chapter initially provided a layman’s look at the ST mission.  The 
considerations driving ST operational requirements were then described.  The METL 
development process is the result of commander’s judgment when applied to two inputs, 
war plans and external directives.  ST core competencies, Terminal Control, Recovery, 
and Reconnaissance are derived from the five AFSOC mission areas.  AFSOC’s mission 
areas are a result of the integration of the six Air Force core competencies and nine 
SOCOM primary missions.  The 720 STG developed nine core tasks to support its core 
competencies.  AFSOCI 36-2204, is the guiding document for ST training requirements.  
This instruction determines the minimum training requirements for ST operators based on 
ST METs.  A TTR spreadsheet was developed to estimate the time required to complete 
the training requirements set forth in AFSOCI 36-2204.  The TTR spreadsheet can be a 
useful tool.  It helps to understand the training required of ST operators.  The ST 
Pararescueman needs 624.5 hours of training to complete the 56 required events.  The ST 
Combat Controller needs 599.5 hours to complete the 80 required tasks.  The TTR 
spreadsheet provides a means to analyze the training requirements, the media used during 
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III. TIME ALLOTTED COMPARED TO TIME REQUIRED 
This chapter will introduce the U.S. Air Force Man-hour Availability Factor 
(MAF).  Although the MAF was primarily produced to develop manpower authorizations 
it can be a useful tool for the study of ST training requirements.  In addition, the 720 STG 
created the Special Tactics Tasking Allocation System (STTAS).  The STTAS was 
implemented in 1998 to ensure the ST weapons system could provide combat ready 
forces to support the CINC’s Theater War Plans and provide maximum support for 
peacetime tasking.   The STTAS provides each squadron with a planning factor on which 
to consider operational requirements, training requirements and the amount of squadron 
manpower available for each.  The 720 STG will attempt to limit operational 
requirements to 60% of operator strength.  The remaining manpower is considered the 
squadrons.  The MAF will then be applied to the remaining time in order to determine the 
Training Time Allotted (TTA).  The resulting TTA will then be compared to the TTR 
derived in the previous chapter.  The chapter will then discuss the significance of the 
resulting data.  
A. THE MAN-HOURS AVAILABILITY FACTOR 
The MAF is a feature used to determine authorized manpower throughout the Air 
Force.  It is a planning factor that represents the average time an individual is available to 
perform their primary duty.  The MAF is formulated by removing non available time 
from the assigned time. Assigned time is defined as the normal duty hours for an assigned 
individual.  Non available time is the average time a member is unavailable for his 
primary job. Non available is comprised of Permanent Change of Station (PCS) related 
activities, leave, medical appointments, organizational duties, and education and training.  
Therefore the simple formula, Assigned hours minus Non Available hours equals 
Available hours, determines the MAF( MAF, 1996, p. 2).    
For the purpose of this thesis the MAF will be used to help quantify the time ST 
members have to perform their primary duty, mainly combat readiness training.  The 
MAF can help approximate the available hours for ST METL’s based training.  The MAF 
is not an exact determination of the available hours.  It is an average compiled from 
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throughout the Air Force.  While the ST operator is not the average Air Force member, 
the MAF can still be a somewhat useful tool (MAF, p. 1).   
B. SPECIAL TACTICS’ MAF DEVIATION 
The accuracy of the MAF is open for debate.  We must remember that the non 
available time used in the MAF computation is an average. The average non available 
time is influenced by a number of factors.  Some of these factors are not universally 
accepted as accurate.  For instance, the estimated time non available for travel to and 
from appointments is obviously low.  Based on practical experience with Permanent 
Change of Station (PCS) within the Air Force and as a ST Team Leader, the estimated 
time lost for PCS is very low.  With regards to ST, the average is likely low for a number 
of other factors including the estimated time lost for formal training and education.   
ST operators have a greater than average need for continuing education and 
training.  The advanced skills such as the survey course, static-line jumpmaster, dive 
supervisor, dive-medical technician, FAA Certified Tower Operator (CTO), the Joint 
Firepower Control Course (JFCC), and other upgrades often require Temporary Duty 
assignment (TDY).  In addition, the ancillary requirements for ST are also greater for ST 
operators than for the average Air Force member.  For instance, each operator must 
posses a Motorcycle Safety Foundation course completion card.  This course can take up 
to three days to complete.  Each operator must maintain a military driver’s license with 
forklift driver, 2.5-ton truck, Humvee, and quad type all terrain vehicles qualifications.  
The flightline driver’s license is also a “must have” qualification.  Each unit has unique 
requirements.  One example is that in order to draw ammunition or demolitions from the 
storage area on Kadena Air Base, an operator must attend additional training to be 
certified.   The list goes on and on.  It might also be argued that due to the physical nature 
of the ST operator job, the instance of injury, and therefore, the amount of convalescence 
leave or non-available time is also higher for the ST operator than the Air Force average.   
Another consideration is that if a ST operator encounters non available time 
during a given duty day, the majority if not all of that day is “lost” or non available due to 
missed training.  It is often impossible to join a training event midway or without the 
entire time uninterrupted.  Without going into great depth to prove the MAF is a bit high 
when it comes to ST, this work will accept the MAF as a conservative estimate of the 
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time available per month for primary duty, but acknowledge that in actuality it might be 
less.   
The MAF published in 1996 is the result of data collection and updated 
information.  The MAF was determined to be 151.5 man-hours per month.  This number 
is up from the 1990 update of 149.2 hours per month.  The MAF used by the Air Force in 
1986 was only 145.2 hours per month.  The 1996 MAF is the peacetime study.  A 
wartime or contingency MAF also exists, but for the purpose of this thesis, the peacetime 
MAF is most applicable.  The 151.5 man-hours per month will be used for all 
calculations unless otherwise stated. (MAF, p. 1)   
C. SPECIAL TACTICS REENGINEERING STUDY 
Each Major Command  (MAJCOM) of the Air Force has the opportunity to 
conduct reengineering studies on their command-unique functions.  AFSOC is presently 
conducting the Special Tactics Reengineering study.  This study will look at squadron, 
group, and MAJCOM-level functions.  It will analyze both the CCT and PJ Air Force 
Specialty Codes (AFSC) but encompass a total of 25 different specialties that support ST.  
The reengineering study is presently reviewing historical TDY data in order to build a 
profile of an average CCT and PJ operator for each unit.  AFSOC is creating a database 
that will hopefully provide the average days an assigned operator is TDY and for what 
reason – contingency, training, etc.  Unfortunately the database is unfinished and 
presently unavailable for release.   
Previous attempts to quantify exactly what is required of a ST operator have 
fallen woefully short.  The standard Air Force approach is to create a Process Oriented 
Description (POD) for each Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC).  This seems to work well 
for support functions within ST squadrons.  However, an accurate POD for the 
Pararescueman and Combat Controller AFSC has never been successfully developed. 
(Driggers)     
D. SPECIAL TACTICS TRAINING AND ALLOCATION SYSTEM 
In order to adapt to the lack of accurate data on the PJ and CCT AFSOC’s, this 
work adopted the STTAS as guideline to quantify the time available for training.  The 
STTAS was implemented in 1998.  It is an attempt to develop a way to better support the 
USAF, USSOCOM, and SOC warfighters in all theaters.  It also hoped to facilitate the 
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necessary joint training required to remain combat ready.  Unit commanders are required 
to provide mission support to primary missions.  These include contingencies and 
wartime taskings, Joint Chief of Staff exercises, joint exercises, and exercise planning 
conferences.  This requirement amounts to 30 % of the available personnel.  The 
secondary missions also generate a requirement for an additional 30 % of available 
personnel.  These missions include unilateral aircrew support, Joint Airborne Air 
Transportability Training (JA/ATT), Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM), 
bilateral exercises, training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), static 
displays/demonstrations, recruiting assistance, and assault zone surveys.  The unit 
commander is allocated 40% for combat readiness training.  From this 40%, the 
commander must take out of hide any formal schools required of an operator and leave 
(Oeser). 
The 60/40 policy was developed over time.  It is justified through the 720 STG 
experience with ongoing, reoccurring, and traditional requirements.  ST does not 
currently have a designated portion of its assets specifically protected from operational 
deployments and dedicated to mission essential combat readiness training.     
The 60/40 policy is a guideline.  Although the group’s requirements may fluctuate 
over time, it implemented this policy to protect itself and the squadrons.  The demand for 
ST operators easily exceeds the supply.  Without this or a similar policy, each ST 
operator could easily be tasked nearly year round.  The present operations involving 
Operation Enduring Freedom are a good example of this fact.  This 60% group policy is 
designed to draw the line at a pain threshold to ensure operator training is protected.  The 
policy does provide each squadron with guidance that can be translated into the 
squadron’s planning considerations.  Each squadron has developed its own process 
implementing combat readiness training. 
E. TRAINING TIME ALLOTED 
The Training Time Allotted (TTA) a squadron for operational readiness training 
is the total time, expressed in hours, that a given operator is afforded to accomplish 
METL based training.  The time frame in which the TTA is expressed is a nine-month 
period.  The purpose of quantifying the TTA based on a nine-month time frame is to 
create a baseline from which to relate all other factors.  The majority of all MET events 
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are required to be performed a given time per nine months.  A few events have yearly 
requirements.  These events will be converted to reflect the nine-month requirement.  
However, we must consider the fact that under the best case conditions, each team will 
accomplish dedicated training only once every nine months.  If an event is not 
accomplished during dedicated training, it will likely be overdue by the time the next 
dedicated training block occurs.  Therefore, even yearly requirements may actually be 
accomplished once every nine months.  The training events required once every 12 
months are minor and require a relatively small amount of time.  The amount of overkill 
is negligible if these events are accomplished once every nine months as opposed to 
every 12.    
The 1996 MAF study determined that the MAF is 151.5 man-hours per month.  
This factor incorporates many factors discussed above including leave and formal 
schools.  In a given nine-month period there are 1363.5 man-hours available.  If we take 
1363.5 and apply the 40 % allocated in the STTAS, the resulting TTA for a nine-month 
period is 545.5.  The 545.5 hours is the most accurate and useful individual TTA that can 
be determined at this time.  The 545.5 hours is the sum total of time available.  Within 
this 545.5 hours, every operator must complete the required METL based training events 
required by AFSOCI 36-2204.   
There may be an area of contention when using this formula. It would likely be 
considered optimistic by ST operators, flight commanders, and squadron commanders 
who have dealt with the real world operational environment.  Most ST squadrons attempt 
to provide each team with one dedicated training cycle every nine months.  This equates 
to approximately 3 months or 13 weeks of training.  If we apply the MAF to this outlook 
the TTA results in only 454.5 hours.  This is 91 hours less than the TTA above.  The 
discrepancy is a result of the squadron’s block training system.  The team is allotted 
dedicated training for 3 months, (33%) of the nine-month period.  However the 60/40 
STTAS split provides for 3.6 months of training every nine months.  This means that the 
91 hours difference is the result of training time that is allotted but not necessarily 
dedicated to that team.  The majority of the team will be tasked to fill operational 
requirements.  A few individual operators should be available to accomplish training, but 
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not necessarily team training.  Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis the accurate TTA 
is 545.5 MAF man-hours.   
F. THE MAF TRAINING TIME REQUIRED  
The TTR spreadsheet must also equate to the above formula.  The MAF is derived 
using an eight-hour workday.  The ST careerfield or that of any SOF branch could not 
survive with only an 8-hour workday.  Not only would the unit fail to meet its training 
objectives, it would fail to prepare its members for the operational environment they are 
likely to face during contingencies.  In order to compare the TTA and TTR we must first 
convert the 12 hour Field Training Exercise into an eight hour MAF day.  The hours 
spent accomplishing each FTX are added.  The total FTX hours are then divided by 12.  
A given FTX accomplishes 12 hours of training but is equated to one eight-hour MAF 
day.  This process translates FTX hours into MAF hours. 
The time spent in the ATC simulator must also be converted using the MAF.  
Civilian contractors operate the ST ATC simulators.  The 2001 ST Training System 
Requirements Analysis (TSRA) concluded that the maximum time a given simulator can 
effectively operate is 6 hours per day (TSRA, p. 43).  This was determined as a result of 
transition time between ATC scenarios, software loading time, maintenance, and other 
considerations.  This seems to pass the common sense test.  A CCT operator could 
accomplish a maximum of six hours in the ATC simulator for a given day.  In addition to 
those hours, he would also be responsible for physical training, preparation, records 
documentation, and provided a short lunch break.  A training day with six hours in the 
simulator would equate to at least an eight-hour duty day. 
It should be noted that the 21 STS located at Pope AFB, North Carolina and the 
22 STS located at McChord AFB, Washington will likely be required to travel on 
Temporary Duty (TDY) to accomplish certain training events.  These squadrons will 
need to convert the time spent TDY to the MAF.  As a rule of thumb, a one-week TDY 
should equate to a minimum of 48 MAF hours.  The time to travel to and from is not 
necessarily considered.   At a minimum an additional 4 hours would be required for TDY 
preparation and a minimum of 4 hours would be required for administrative actions 
following the TDY.  The Air Force has a policy concerning TDY and Compensatory 
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Time Off (CTO).  The length of time spent TDY for training events should be limited, 
however some CTO is usually afforded an operator for a lengthy TDY.   
The PJ’s have National Registry Emergency Medical Technician (NREMT) 
qualifications that require TDY travel.  The Special Operations Forces Medical Skills 
Sustainment Program (SOFMSSP) is a 14-day course taught at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina.  According to Master Sergeant Pat O’Neil, SOFMSSP fulfills all NREMT 
qualifications (O’Neil).  The MAF conversion for this MET training event is: 10(duty 
days) x 8 = 80 MAF hours.  The PJ is allotted one day preparation and one day for CTO 
because the course runs continuously without weekend break.  This brings the total to 96 
hours.     
G. STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING SYSTEM 
The SORTS percentage does not directly affect each training event contained in 
the TTR spreadsheet.  When the SORTS requirement is 100% it is obvious that every 
operator is required to accomplish the event in the given time period.  We might expect 
that a SORTS requirement of less than 100 % would affect the TTR.  An event with an 
attached SORTS requirement demands that percentage of the available operators to have 
accomplished the event once during the designated time frame in order for the squadron 
to report trained (T).  If the squadron were to perfectly manage its resources, it might be 
possible to only train to the SORTS level.  Consider the Rigging Alternate Method 
Zodiac (RAMZ) MET event.  The RAMZ requirement for PJ’s is 66%.  If the squadron 
identified two of the three teams as RAMZ teams the 66% SORTS requirement would 
apparently be met.  But this would also put the squadron in serious jeopardy of falling 
below that 66% line.  If training for either the two designated teams failed to materialize, 
the squadron would be unable to report trained for that MET.  The SORTS requirement 
for the RAMZ MET concerning CCT is only 33%.  A SORTS percentage this low could 
in fact have an affect on the CCT TTR man-hours.  Attempting to designate specific 
teams or operators to meet the 33% would be a management nightmare with the training 
system presently in place.  The SORTS percentage is merely the percentage of available 
operators that must be trained and current in a given skill for the squadron to report 
“Trained” to higher headquarters. The squadron might develop a system to maintain only 
the minimum required percentage current at all times. This system, if developed, does not 
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alleviate the requirement for every operator to accomplish that event.  For the purpose of 
the TTR spreadsheet, each event must be completed once as per AFSOCI 36-2204.   
The spreadsheet does contain a number of special case MET events.  The first is 
Terminal Attack Control (TAC).  The SORTS requirement is only 25% of available 
operators.  The squadron may maintain a currency level greater than required but the 
minimum is 25%.  TAC currency is based on AFI 13-102.  All terminal air controllers 
must make one call per quarter.  The currency should not be allowed to lapse.   The other 
special case events fall into the infiltration/exfiltration category.  These three special case 
events are night static-line practical, night tactical military free fall, and tactical overland 
movement.  Each event has a SORTS percentage attached to it.  The SORTS percentage 
is tied to multiple iterations of the event.  The standard military free fall requirement is a 
minimum of once every nine months.  The SORTS requirement for this event is twice 
every nine months.  This SORTS requirement applies to 66% of the available operators.  
The same requirement applies for night static-line practical.  The tactical overland 
movement also has a 66% SORTS requirement.  It requires four iterations every nine 
months.  These special case events will generate required training hours in addition to the 
generic hours provided in the TTR spreadsheet, Appendix A.     
The additional training needed for these special case events requires a unique 
approach to computing TTR.  Appendix A contains a column labeled “Special Case”.  
The TTR special case, is the mechanism used to incorporate these events.  Twelve 
operators, 66% of a team, require an additional night static-line practical and an 
additional military free fall event.  The time required to accomplish both of these events 
is 24 hours.  These events would likely be categorized as an FTX and therefore require 
two additional days of training or 16 MAF hours.  The TAC event requires a minimum of 
three days to accomplish.  This will generate an additional 24 MAF hours for each TAC 
event.  However, these hours will only apply to 25% of the team or a total of 5 operators 
per team.  The special case events contribute an additional 600 team man-hours to the 





H. TRAINING TIME REQUIRED COMPARED TO ALLOTTED 
The minimum individual CCT TTR is 572.83 hours.  The TTA per combat 
controller is 545.5 hours.  The team’s total CCT TTA is 9,819 MAF hours; 545.5 MAF 
hours x 18 operators.  The team’s CCT TTR is 10,312 MAF hours.  The additional 
special case events raise the generic CCT TTR by 600 team man-hours.  The total CCT 
TTR is 10,911.  The numbers contained in the TTR Spreadsheets, Appendix A and B, 
represent the TTR of the 23 STS based at Hurlburt Air Field, Florida.  The disparity in 
TTR and TTA would be even higher for a squadron that must send its operators TDY for 
TAC requirements, AC-130 Gunship CFF, and helicopter CFF.  Appendix C contains the 
Combat Control TTR for these squadrons.  The shortfall of TTA is even greater than that 
illustrated in Table 1. below.  
 
 
TTA (individual)   545.50 
TTR (individual)             572.83 
TTA Shortfall               27.33 
 
TTA (Team)    9,819 
TTR (Team)  10,911 
TTA Shortfall              1,092 
 
 
The minimum individual PJ TTR is 597 hours.  The TTA per Pararescueman is 
545.5 hours.  The team’s Total PJ TTA is 9,819 hours.  The additional special case events 
raise the team’s TTR, 10,746 hours, by 480 additional man-hours.  This addition raises 
the team’s total TTR hours to 11,226 hours.  As depicted in Table 2., we have determined 
that the TTR is greater than the TTA.   
 
 
TTA (individual)   545.5 
TTR (individual)  597.0 
TTA Shortfall:    51.5 
 
TTA (Team)    9,819 
TTR (Team)  11,226 
TTA Shortfall              1,407 
Table 1.  CCT Training Time Required vs Training Time Allotted






I. DATA ANALYSIS 
The TTR spreadsheet tells us quite a bit about the training requirements of ST 
operators.  A good portion of the CCT operator’s time is spent accomplishing infiltration 
and exfiltration training.  This phase of the operation accounts for up to one third of the 
time requirement.  There is a danger that focusing on this phase of the operation might 
lead to a lack of time available for skills that will be required during the next phase of 
operation, actions on the objective.  No one phase is more critical than the next.  A failure 
to train for any one phase of the mission is unacceptable.   
The limited time dedicated solely to Recovery is not necessarily an indication of 
lack of emphasis.  The combat controller’s role during recovery operations can be very 
important.  However, training specifically for the Recovery mission may not require a 
significant amount of time.  The vast majority of the skills a Combat Controller brings to 
a Recovery mission are those required during any ST mission.  The CCT skills transfer 
well to Recovery missions.  The helicopter CFF training listed in the Terminal Control 
category is a skill highly applicable to the Recovery mission.  Another skill, overland 
movement, is categorized in the infiltrate/exfiltrate portion of the TTR, but it is also a 
skill that is crucial during an Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR) mission.   
The Combat Controller dedicates approximately 28 % of his requirements to 
terminal control, the controller’s primary skill.  This percentage is not excessive.  This 
would seem to in line with mission priorities.  The ATC requirement is five ATC 
practicals every nine months.  Because ATC is a perishable skill and the Combat 
Controller’s primary skill, the fact that this event is required more often than any other 
should come as no surprise.  The focused training that can be accomplished in the ATC 
simulator is extremely valuable.  If the same controller were to accomplish similar 
training in the field, the time requirements would be at least four times greater.  The 
simulator is not a replacement for actual air traffic but the controlled environment enables 
creation of a valuable training environment.    A separate breakdown of dive operations is 
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provided for quick reference to this skill.  Dive operations accounts for 4.8 % of a 
Combat Controllers time.  The dive qualification requirement has come under scrutiny in 




The PJ TTR spreadsheet also contains some very useful data.  As with the CCT 
TTR spreadsheet, it indicates that the training requirements exceed the time allotted.  The 
infiltrate/exfiltrate portion of the spreadsheet contains approximately 27 % of the PJ’s 
time requirements.  The Medical category accounts for just over 21 % of the PJ training 
time required.  It should be noted that the NREMT requirements are biannual 
requirements.  The TTR spreadsheet contains data reflecting the year when these 
requirements are due.  The out year is reflected in a separate spreadsheet, Attachment D.  
As indicated by the spreadsheet and chart above, Reconnaissance only accounts 
for 5.1 % of the time requirements.  This requirement does not require a significant 
Figure 2. TTR Spreadsheet Data 
   
   
  
   
CCT EVENTS 
  
1.  Recovery  3% 
2.  Terminal Control 14% 
3.  Terminal Attack Control 14% 
4.  Reconnaissance 10% 
5.  C4I 5% 
6.  Defensive Measures 10% 
7.  Mission prep (FMP) 15% 
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commitment of time because the PJ’s role during this type mission is limited.  The time 
to train for this mission is a small percentage of a PJ’s TTR, but the 32 hours per 















J. UNCOUNTED TRAINING TIME  
The TTR encompasses the entire time required to accomplish the actual training 
event.  It does not include the time required to schedule, plan, organize, or coordinate the 
required training.  Each squadron has a process designed to forecast, schedule, and plan 
readiness training.  A complicating factor to consider is that the STTAS stipulated the 
720 STG can task 60% of the unit’s manpower.  If 60% of the operator strength is tapped 
by the group, who is on station preparing the training plan, conducting coordination, and 
preparing for the training events required by AFSOCI 36-2204?   
The scheduling, planning, and coordinating of readiness training is a time 
consuming and involved process.  Any time spent planning and coordinating is time not 
spent actually training.  Quantifying the time spent planning and coordinating training is 









PARARESUCE EVENTS      
  
1.  Recovery 22% 
2.  Medical 21% 
3.  Terminal Control 2% 
4.  Reconnaissance 5% 
5.  C4I 2% 
6.  Deffensive Measures  8% 
7.  Missions Prep (FMP) 14% 









not the effort of this thesis.  It should suffice to say that minimizing the time planning and 
coordinating readiness training is a worthwhile goal.  On the other hand, effective 
planning, preparation and coordination directly contribute to the quality of training and 
the benefits achieved by that training.  The time devoted to set up the training will 
invariably be deducted from the training time allotted.  This fact will make it even more 
difficult to ensure the operators are fully trained to accomplish their mission. 
Many questions arise as a result of the spreadsheet and data analysis.  Although 
many questions may come to mind, most are beyond the scope of this thesis.  Questions 
such as how were these minimum requirements determined?  Does the minimum training 
events qualify ST operators as expert in the given skill set?  Do the minimum required 
training events qualify the ST operator to work in the joint environment at the highest 
level?  These and many other questions are questions that require independent research.  
They will not be addressed during this thesis.    
K. SUMMARY 
This chapter was designed to compare the Training Time Allotted (TTA) and the 
Training Time Required (TTR).  By combining the 1996 MAF study and the Special 
Tactics Training and Allocation System, the total TTA was determined to be 9,819 hours 
per team.  The total TTR was determined by converting the generic TTR, to MAF hours 
and factoring in special case events that are only required of a percentage of the available 
operators.  The total CCT TTR is 10,911 hours per team.   The end result is that the 
Training Time Available is less than the Training Time Required.  The difference in this 
case is 1,092 hours.  The PJ TTR, 11,226 hours, are also greater than the TTA, 9,819 
hours.  The difference amounts to 1,407 hours.  The following chapter will attempt to 
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IV.  ALTERNATE APPROACHES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If we accept that ST operators have an insufficient Training Time Allotted (TTA), 
then must we accept that a readiness gap exists?  If the readiness gap exists, has it been 
identified?  Has this readiness gap been exposed during contingency operations?  If this 
readiness shortfall has not been exposed, then how does Special Tactics (ST) overcome, 
disguise, or avoid the shortfall?  What mechanisms does ST employ to manage this 
training gap?  What are the consequences of allowing a readiness gap to exist?  In 
essence, has ST developed mitigating strategies to deal with the training shortfall?  If ST 
has developed a strategy to deal with the training shortfall, does an actual readiness gap 
truly exist?  ST has been adept at creative readiness training to ensure a readiness gap 
does not become a mission stopper.  However, it should be noted that in early 2002 the 
Air Force Manpower and Innovation Agency (AFMIA) identified ST as a Long 
Haul/Stressed Career Field as a result of Operation Enduring Freedom.  
This chapter offers a systematic approach to identify options capable of bringing a 
resolution to the imbalance in TTA and Training Time Required (TTR).  The options are 
to increase the TTA, decrease the TTR, or a combination of both.  Because the TTA 
formula is comprised of time available and the Man-hours Availability Factor (MAF), it 
can be increased two different ways.  First, the MAF for ST could be increased.  Second, 
providing additional training time would also increase the overall TTA.  The options to 
reduce the TTR are numerous.  The first and most obvious way to reduce the TTR is to 
remove or delete some mission essential tasks.  Although this is an option, it is not 
usually considered a good one.  Seven other options to reduce the TTR will be presented.   
B. INCREASE TRAINING TIME ALLOTTED 
The TTA derived in Chapter three is the combination of training time available 
and the MAF.  The MAF is the time available for conduct of one’s primary duty.  
Increasing time available for ST operators increases the TTA.  There are three areas that 
can increase ST’s man-hours availability factor; leave, Permanent change of Station 
(PCS), and official appointments.  Individual leave serves to reduce the MAF.  A 
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controlled management of leave could reduce the impact it has on the MAF.  Block leave 
is a management tool used by a unit to control leave authorization in order to minimize 
impact on squadron operations.  Although block leave is an unpopular management tool, 
it could be employed to reduce the impact of missed training opportunities.   
The PCS of an individual operator has a significant impact on the individual’s 
training time available.  A significant amount of time available is lost at the losing base 
for out-processing.  In addition, a significant amount of time is lost at the gaining base for 
in-processing.  Attempts to minimize the effects of PCS moves within ST have been 
made.  A study of the Airman Assignment Management System (AMS) indicates that 
PCS moves are often driven by the need to fill overseas vacancies (Hill, p. 45).  Overseas 
assignments are normally shorter than stateside assignments.  ST units in Okinawa AB, 
Japan and Mildenhal AB, United Kingdom are the overseas units which might prevent an 
overall reduction in the number of PCS moves throughout the ST careerfield.   
It seems that one way to reduce PCS moves ST wide is to increase the length of 
overseas assignments.  The only other apparent option is to consolidate the overseas ST 
units.  The operators from overseas units could be permanently assigned to stateside 
units.  A support infrastructure would remain forward at the overseas location.  ST 
operators would deploy for temporary duty to the forward locations on a rotational basis.  
Although this Special Tactics Expeditionary (STX) option has been considered, the 
benefits, drawbacks, and feasibility has not been fully explored.  
The final way to increase the MAF is to manage the official appointments of ST 
operators.  A system could be developed to control when appointments are scheduled in 
order to reduce the impact on training.  This is a difficult task considering the fact that ST 
operators are off station supporting missions or on station training.  The best option is to 
schedule official appointments when the operator is on station but not involved in 
dedicated team training.   
The second way to increase TTA is to increase the time available.  The Special 
Tactics Training and Allocation System (STTAS) sets group requirements at 60% leaving 
40% for squadron needs.  There are two major ways to increase time available.  First, the 
60/40 split could be altered.  A 50/50 split would significantly increase the TTA.  An 
equal 50/50 split would provide an additional 136.25 hours of TTA.  It would appear that 
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an equal 50/50 split would virtually solve the problem.  Unfortunately the 60/40 split is 
required in order to meet the 720 STG operational needs.  Performing these support 
functions, exercises, and contingency missions have a valuable positive effect on the 
readiness of the operators accomplishing them.  The experience of hands on actual 
employment, whether in support of training events, exercises, or actual contingency 
operations is an invaluable learning and training experience.  Reducing this requirement 
to 50% would reduce the experience gained during these mission support functions.  The 
tradeoff between mission support and dedicated team training must be acknowledged.   
Another way to increase time available is to alter how the 60/40 split is 
determined.  Presently any formal schools, Professional Military Education, and leave 
must be deducted from the squadron’s 40%.  If the required formal schools such as the 
ST survey course, jumpmaster school, and Special Operations Forces Medical Skills 
Sustainment Program (SOFMSSP) were to be deducted from the group’s percentage, the 
time available would increase.  This translates directly into increased TTA.   
C. REDUCE THE TRAINING TIME REQUIRED 
The most apparent way to reduce the TTR is to delete or remove some of the 
required Mission Essential Tasks (MET).  The fewer events the operator is required to 
perform the less the TTR.  Inherently, every MET is critical to the success of the unit’s 
wartime mission.  If specific events or core tasks were to be removed, the unit’s mission 
statement must change.  The unit’s wartime taskings would have to be adjusted to reflect 
the change in MET’s not trained.  If reconnaissance were removed from the squadron as a 
core task, the unit would not be required to train the associated events.  A commander 
who removes any unit MET is acknowledging the unit can not perform its stated mission 
(FM 25-100).   
A more feasible way to decrease the TTR is to increase the number of events 
performed using Field Training Exercise (FTX) conditions.  Increasing the number of 
FTX’s serves to reduce the TTR by increasing the time spent training without increasing 
the MAF hours.  A normal training day is eight hours.  A FTX accomplishes 12 hours of 
training but only accounts for eight hours by MAF figures.  This approach is not 
necessarily a win-win situation.  An FTX is an event where the mission scenario drives 
the training.  The ability to control the learning environment is sacrificed for a realistic 
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training scenario.  The training event is mission driven not progress driven.  The time to 
prepare for an FTX should be greater than preparation for a practical exercise.  These 
tradeoffs must be considered when determining the number of FTX events programmed 
during dedicated team training.   
The next way to decrease the TTR is to combine training events.  Multiple events 
could be conducted at the same time.  For example, a static-line practical event and an 
extreme environmental training event could be combined.  The jump could be followed 
by a simulated chemical attack that requires protective actions.  This is a simple example 
and fairly easy to accomplish without significantly impacting the effectiveness of either 
event.  However, the options to perform multiple events simultaneously are limited when 
considering the true intent of the event.   
A variation of combining events can also decrease TTR.  A round robin event is 
one where operators rotate through various training events that are conducted in 
succession or simultaneously.  An example is setting up multiple Call For Fire (CFF) 
operations on the same range or nearby ranges.  One ST element could be in control of 
AC-130 Gunship CFF while another ST element on the same or a nearby range could be 
in control of helicopter CFF operations.  After each element conducts its CFF training, 
the aircraft switch to the other element.  A true round robin would also include a third 
event such as an Air Traffic Control (ATC).  A third element of the same ST flight could 
be conducting ATC training.  All three elements would rotate through each training 
event.  The TTR to accomplish training in this manner would be less than the time 
required conducting each event separately.  
A good way to set clear, attainable goals, remove distractions, and provide a 
focused training effort is to create standardized training packages.  Standardized training 
packages can help accomplish more in a given period of time.  These standardized 
training packages could be developed to help ensure training meets the individual and 
unit training needs.  The 23 STS has developed an approach to dedicated team training 
that uses a training template to identify all forecasted training during dedicated team 
training.  The training template does not impose specific mission scenarios.  There is a 
danger, especially in the Special Operations community, when attempting to standardize 
that innovation, flexibility, and creativity will be stymied.  Standard training packages 
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help accomplish the most in a given period by identifying areas of primary concern.  The 
23 STS training template is comprised of standard training packages that identify not 
only what training will be accomplished, but also what training will not be accomplished.  
At least this approach gives the squadron commander visibility on his unit’s training 
shortfalls.   
In theory, each ST squadron should shortly be able to improve its training 
program.    When the Advanced Skills Training (AST) course begins providing combat 
ready operators, the squadron can eliminate or compress the crawl phase of the crawl, 
walk, run, training approach.  All squadron operators will already have a minimum level 
of experience.  The need to begin at square one should be eliminated.  Combine this 
concept with the approach to training that the most effective way to train is to maintain a 
minimum level of proficiency at all times and a useful system emerges.  An old fitness 
saying is that, “the best way to get into shape is to never get out of shape.”  If the 
operator’s proficiency is never allowed to deteriorate below a minimum acceptable level, 
training is more effective.  For instance, if an operator fails to make a MFF jump for 90 
days he must first do a day non-equipment jump before accomplishing a night MFF 
practical.  This adds a minimum of 8 hours of training that could be better used 
elsewhere.  Implementing a system to prevent the time consuming process of regaining a 
basic proficiency could be highly beneficial.  
D. MINIMUM “SORTS” REQUIREMENT 
The TTR spreadsheet, attachment one, contains a Status of Resources and 
Training System (SORTS) percentage column for specific MET events.  The TTR could 
be reduced if ST were to maintain only the minimum requirements for each of the 
required SORTS events.  One system to accomplish this is to designate flights according 
to infiltration means.  For instance, one flight would be the air operations team.  It would 
train the airborne infiltration means.  Another team would be designated the Scuba team.  
This approach has been attempted in the past.  A squadron organized along these lines 
encountered many difficulties.  The team generally lost focus on its primary objective, 
the mission once in place.  The tendency was to over-train the infiltration portion of the 
mission.  ST can not organize along these lines.  Mission constraints dictate the 
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infiltration method employed.  ST operators must have the flexibility to infiltrate via the 
most viable means necessary.   
E. CORE MISSION SPECIALIZATION 
Limited manpower is partially responsible for the requirement to develop ST 
operators with the necessary skills to perform each of the three core ST missions.  In 
general, ST does not specialize an operator’s skills to allow a focus on a specific core 
skill.  Each operator is expected to maintain the skills necessary to perform nearly any ST 
mission.  However, an effort to specialize might prove beneficial.  Specialization could 
increase the ability of a team to fully train its operators for a given mission.   
Presently ST does not task organize in the true sense of the word.  Each operator 
is considered a jack-of-all-trades.  Each seven level controller is virtually interchangeable 
for every other seven level controller.  The same goes for PJ’s; on paper a PJ is a PJ.  
Unlike Army Special Forces (SF), which maintains specific specialties within the team, a 
Combat Controller is Combat Controller. A SF Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) is 
usually comprised of 12 members possessing one of five specialty skills.  A Special 
Tactics Flight is comprised of 18 ST operators.  Each Pararescueman or Combat 
Controller shares the same skill sets.  Each Combat Controller completes the same two-
year CCT training pipeline.  Each PJ completes the same two-year PJ pipeline.   
However, once assigned to an operational squadron there may be an opportunity 
to specialize. ST could develop a system to allow emphasis on specific skill sets.  The 
ability to train in depth for that skill set would be increased.  If each ST flight were 
designed to contain three Special Tactics Teams (STT), the flight would be able to 
develop specialized skill sets oriented towards a primary, secondary, and tertiary core 
mission.  The flight’s training could be designed to apportion training weighted towards 
its primary core mission, less on its secondary core mission, and the remaining on its 
tertiary core mission.  A flight organized along these lines could task organize 
effectively.  The overall TTR to meet training requirements could be reduced if the team 
were to task organize.   
F. PACKETIZE 
This new flight organization might also allow for development of packetized STT 
events, individual events, and flight events during dedicated training.  Each six man STT 
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would share the same training needs.  If this six-man STT were to consistently operate as 
an element, the team would maintain proficiency on a set of operational skills.  This STT 
could then focus only on training that requires proficiency updates.  The TTR to perform 
all the necessary MET’s would be reduced.  This type of mission focused organization 
would prevent individuals from over training skills that are already proficient.  Under the 
current ST training program, the entire flight enters dedicated training together.  Training 
as an entire flight fails to prevent training of skills that individual operators are already 
proficient at.  
Along with this benefit, the flight’s flattened organization structure would allow 
elements and individuals to pursue opportune training during times other than team 
dedicated training cycle.  A six-man STT that is not deployed or tasked with mission 
support events could pursue training that fills its training shortfalls.  The element would 
be free to seek opportune training based on its prioritized needs.  Individual operators not 
deployed would also be enabled to pursue prioritized individual opportune training.  
Individual training events could be identified and prioritized to readily establish training 
goals for individual operators on station but not involved in dedicated team training.   
This packetization of ST skill sets should also allow a full flight sized event to 
envelop multiple mission sets.  Each STT would be capable of rolling into a full flight 
sized event but remain flexible enough to focus on its own primary skill set.  The present 
ST training system does not necessarily provide this flexibility.  An example of this 
inflexibility is the requirement for a Combat Controller to perform an airfield seizure 
mission.  The intent of this requirement is for the controller to perform some portion of 
the Jump Clearing Team (JCT) mission.  However, a controller performing equipment 
recovery associated with a JCT mission would not be fulfilling the intent of the 
requirement.  Under this packetized skill set organizational structure, he could perform a 
recovery type mission associated with the airfield mission and meet the MET 
requirement.  The equipment recovery training would train the function identified as his 
team’s primary task during the airfield seizure mission.  
The final technique presented to reduce the TTR is to matrix the infiltration MET 
events with specific mission sets.  This technique can be employed to identify the 
importance of each infiltration means to a given mission.  Each ST core mission has an 
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associated primary, secondary and tertiary infiltration means.  For instance, the primary 
infiltration means for a standard Personnel Recovery (PR) mission is usually the airland 
option.  If mission analysis precludes this option, a secondary option might be to proceed 
overland to the survivor.  A Subsequent option might be a MFF insertion.  The matrix of 
infiltration means for a PR element would reflect these priorities.  A ST element task 
organized against the PR mission would train infiltration means accordingly.   
Although each STT would attempt to train every infiltration means necessary, the 
matrix of infiltration means and core mission would identify the most vital training 
required.  Once an STT performs the primary, secondary, and tertiary infiltration means it 
can begin to train for less likely scenarios, such as amphibious insertion.  For instance, an 
STT task organized as a primary Special Reconnaissance (SR) team would likely not 
train for amphibious infiltration unless it was already proficient in MFF, static line and an 
associated tertiary infiltration means such as overland infiltration.   
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter systematically identified options to reconcile the imbalance between 
Training Time Allotted (TTA) and Training Time Required (TTR).  The three options 
available, increase the TTA, decrease the TTR, or combinations of both are fairly 
obvious.  Raising the MAF through control of military leave, reduction of PCS 
frequency, and control of official appointments can increase TTA.  Manipulation of the 
Special Tactics Training and Allocation System can increase the training time available 
and in turn increase TTA.    
TTR can be reduced in various ways.  First, Mission Essential Tasks (MET’s) can 
be deleted or removed reducing the number of required training events.  Second, 
increasing the number of Field Training Exercises accomplishes more training during a 
given day.  Third, training events can be combined cutting the TTR.  Fourth, standard 
training packages could help save time and increase efficiency.  Fifth, a minimum level 
of proficiency could be maintained eliminating the time consuming crawl phase of 
training.  The sixth way TTR can be reduced is by training only to the minimum SORTS 
percentage alleviating the requirement for every operator to maintain proficiency on 
certain skills.  The next technique to reduce TTR is to core mission specialize reducing 
TTR through task organization.  Finally, developing a matrix of infiltration means and 
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missions allows the operators to train most applicable infiltration methods fully while 
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V.  SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis used a number of steps in order to substantiate a hypothesis; the 
divergence of Air Force and SOCOM missions combined with sub-optimal readiness 
organization has strained the ability of Special Tactics to meet operational objectives.  
The fist step was to identify ST operational requirements.  The ST operational 
requirements are to perform the designated ST core competencies when tasked with a 
given mission.  ST core competencies Terminal Control, Recovery, and Reconnaissance 
are derived from the five AFSOC mission areas.  AFSOC’s mission areas are a result of 
the integration of the six Air Force core competencies and nine SOCOM primary 
missions.   
The 720 STG developed nine core tasks to support its core competencies.  Three 
core tasks; Air Traffic Control (ATC), Terminal Attack Control (TAC), and austere 
airfield operations directly support the Terminal Control core competency.  The ST 
Recovery core competency demands in depth training of three core tasks, Personnel 
Recovery (PR), equipment recovery, and battlefield trauma.  Finally, survey/assessment, 
weather forecasting, and Special Reconnaissance (SR) core tasks ensure readiness for the 
reconnaissance core competency.  
With the operational demands defined, the Training Time Required (TTR) to meet 
those demands could be undertaken.  The TTR spreadsheet provides a useful 
quantification of the time involved to train for ST operational demands.  The ST 
Pararescueman needs 597 hours of training to complete the 56 required events.  The ST 
Combat Controller needs 573 hours to complete the 80 required tasks.  
A combination of the 1996 Man-hours Availability Factor (MAF) study and the 
Special Tactics Training and Allocation System (STTAS) generated the Training Time 
Allotted (TTA) per operator, 545.5 hours for a given nine-month period, establishing a 
standard to compare to the available TTR.  The TTA per team, 9,819 hours, is the result 
of the 545.5 hours multiplied by 18, the number of operators on that team.    
The total TTR was determined by converting the generic TTR, to MAF hours and 
factoring in special case events that are only required of a percentage of the available 
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operators.  The total CCT TTR is 10,911 hours per team.   The end result is that the 
Training Time Available is less than the Training Time Required.  The difference in this 
case is 1,092 hours.  The Pararescueman (PJ) TTR, 11,226 hours, is also greater than the 
TTA, 9819 hours.  The shortfall for pararescueman is 1,407 hours.   
The three overall options available to reconcile the imbalance between TTA and 
TTR brought to light many considerations.  The three general approaches are to increase 
the TTA, decrease the TTR, or a combination of both.  Raising the MAF through control 
of military leave, reduction of PCS frequency, and control of official appointments can 
increase TTA.  Manipulation of the Special Tactics Training and Allocation System 
could also increase the TTA.   
There are eight options to decrease time required in order to bring it in line with 
the time allotted.  First, Mission Essential Tasks (MET’s) can be deleted or removed 
reducing the number of required training events reducing the TTR.  Second, increasing 
the number of Field Training Exercises accomplishes more training during a given day.  
Third, training events can be combined cutting the TTR.  Fourth, standard training 
packages could help save time and increase efficiency.  Fifth, a minimum level of 
proficiency could be maintained eliminating the time consuming crawl phase of training.  
The sixth way TTR can be reduced is by training only to the minimum SORTS 
percentage alleviating the requirement for every operator to maintain proficiency on 
certain skills.  The next technique to reduce TTR is to specialize by core mission thus 
reducing TTR through task organization.  Finally, developing a matrix of infiltration 
means and missions allows the operators to train most applicable infiltration methods 
fully while attempting to minimize training on less likely mission scenarios.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  Manage Official Appointments  
Of the three options identified to increase ST MAF, only the management of 
official appointments is recommended at this time.  Official appointments including flight 
physicals, dental exams, and Professional Military Education (PME) can adversely 
impact individual and flight readiness training.  The exact nature of how to control or 
manage appointments is not determined here.  The goal of such a system should be to 
minimize the impact of appointments during crucial readiness training.  The flight 
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commander, operations section, and individual operator should coordinate well in 
advance the most opportune time to accomplish such official duties.     
The two other options available to increase ST MAF deal with control of 
individual leave and Permanent Change of Station (PCS).  Neither option is 
recommended at this time.  Block leave might help increase time available but the 
flexibility and morale of ST might be adversely impacted.  The leave request system 
presently in place allows for maximum flexibility.  The individual operator normally 
seeks leave during times that will affect his training the least.  Block leave would not 
only restrict individual flexibility but also restrict squadron flexibility.   
2.  Explore PCS Reduction Options  
Although a reduction in frequency of PCS moves can significantly affect training 
time available at both the losing and gaining bases a comprehensive study of the exact 
benefits must be accomplished.  The Special Tactics Expeditionary (STX) concept should 
be fully explored.  Particular attention should be paid to the TTA gain that might result 
from consolidation of overseas operator positions into stateside units.  These benefits 
should be compared to the TTA gained by lengthening overseas assignments through 
voluntary or involuntary means.  The STX concept may run contrary to SOF focus on 
theater engagement, regional expertise, cultural awareness, and the trend of SOF as the 
initial force pushing the bounds of theater access.   
3.  Evaluate STTAS  
Another area requiring further examination is the STTAS.  The system was 
developed and implemented in 1998.  The operational environment is not the same as it 
was in 1998.  AFSOC Program Plan 96-01, a major factor considered in development of 
the STTAS, is no longer in effect.  The STTAS must be evaluated for currency, 
effectiveness, and accuracy.  The 720 STG should solicit input from each squadron 
concerning the impact STTAS has on readiness.  A cost benefit analysis of the 60/40 split 
should be accomplished.  This analysis should attempt to determine when team training is 
more beneficial to readiness than an off station exercise.  In addition, the way the split is 
determined should be re-evaluated.  Particular attention should be given to how leave, 
PME, and formal schools come into play.   
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4.  Maintain Squadron Mission Essential Tasks 
The next area addressed concerns reducing the TTR.  A critical call must be made 
at the highest level to either keep squadron MET’s as is or to remove MET’s that might 
be elevated to a group level task.  This work recommends that the best alternative is to 
maintain the existing squadron MET’s.  In order to remove or elevate a squadron MET to 
a group level task proper justification must be offered.  Is the MET inherent to the 
success of a squadron mission?  Does the task require a separate unit, tasked as functional 
expert for a single MET?  What impact would removal of a squadron MET have on the 
unit, the 720 STG, and the individual operators?  Can ST afford the manpower involved 
in the creation of a group level entity focused on a specific core task?  The answers to 
these questions do not lend credence to the removal of any MET or to the elevation of a 
MET to the group level.  Recovery, reconnaissance, and terminal control are imbedded 
and interrelated squadron core tasks.    
There is, however, one MET that is included in the PJ events that should be 
considered for elimination.   The Reconnaissance and Surveillance Practical as a separate 
event may not be the best use of a Pararescueman’s time.  The reconnaissance concept of 
operations should be reviewed to determine the likelihood of a PJ employing on such a 
mission.  If PJ’s are considered necessary for reconnaissance type missions, do they 
require specific training in addition to events contained in AFSOCI 36-2204?  A number 
of events partially prepare a PJ for a reconnaissance type mission including Small Unit 
Tactics, overland movement, ground search, and reconnaissance equipment refresher.  
The 24 MAF hours spent on the reconnaissance practical can be better spent on readiness 
training more applicable to the PJ portion the ST mission.   
5.  Improve the STS Training Template 
The next recommendation wraps three alternatives into one recommendation.  
Three options to decrease TTR involve increasing the number of FTX’s, combining 
events, and standardized training packages.  The dedicated team training template 
developed by the 23 STS provides a framework to help employ each of these options.  
The recommendation is to use the 23 STS training template as a baseline approach to 
readiness.  The template goes a long way but it can be improved.  First, a TTR tracking 
system could be implemented to track progress.  The TTR tracking could be used to 
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avoid overtraining specific events.  The TTR tracking would be useful to identification of 
the trade off in training accomplished versus training shortfalls.  The improved template 
can help the Special Tactics Officer (STO) identify readiness strengths and weaknesses.  
The template can help identify the optimum number of FTX’s, identify opportunities for 
combined or round robin events, and help identify standard training packages.  In 
coordination with this improved template, the squadron training shop should be fully 
employed to help with long range planning and coordination in order to limit time spent 
by the team preparing, planning, and coordinating training events.   
6.  Task Organize via a Six-Man Special Tactics Team  
The time to specialize according to core mission is now at hand.  The time 
required to meet operational demands exceeds that allotted.  However, a new approach 
using core mission specialization can help alleviate the problem.  Specialization by flight 
is not the best option.  If a new concept of operations is developed based on a six man 
Special Tactics Team (STT), a clear opportunity to specialize develops.  Each ST Flight 
could be comprised of three six man STT’s.  Each STT would have a primary, secondary, 
and tertiary mission.  Each STT would employ together, train together, and therefore 
share the same readiness needs.  This approach would flatten the organizational structure 
of the flight and squadron.  Each STT would be empowered to seek opportune training to 
fully develop its primary and secondary core mission while minimizing time spent 
training its tertiary mission until the others are fully trained.    
The reduced span of control creates a near autonomous operational team capable 
of deploying as a STT contributing to any SOF or conventional mission.  Because ST 
rarely if ever employs as a flight, task organizing along core competencies makes sense.  
Not only does this follow concepts and recommendations outlined in FM 25-101, Battle 
Focused Training, but it creates the opportunity to reduce TTR and improve readiness.  
FM 100-25 recommends that a unit execute training as it executes combat.  “The chain of 
command is present, in charge and responsible” (p. 4-2).  The six-man STT concept of 
operations can help operationalize STO’s.  It will give STOs an in depth appreciation of 
operational mission development.  The six-man STT will provide each STT with 
leadership, limited topcover, and officer advocacy when employed.  It is recommended 
that the ST Team Leader be provided specific guidance as to his priorities.  Team Leader 
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guidance books should be developed to maintain standard training approaches ensuring 
quality STT readiness.   
7.  Matrix Infiltration Means 
Tied to this recommendation to task organize along ST core competencies is the 
recommendation to matrix infiltration and exfiltraion means according to core tasks.  If a 
matrix of infiltration means is developed it can provide a prioritized list of training events 
to support the core competencies required of that STT.  A matrix can maximize readiness 
of a STT to employ via the most probable means and minimize time training on less 
likely mission scenarios.  The development of this matrix will require complex mission 
analysis by experienced ST operators.   
C. CONCLUSION 
USAF Special Tactics (ST) is a high leverage Special Operations force.  ST 
exhibited asymmetric impact during Operation Enduring Freedom.  Special Tactics 
impact can be categorized into three areas, theater access, air-to-ground interface, and 
recovery operations.  As 3.6 % of AFSOC and only .8 % of US Special Operations 
Command, ST was responsible for control of approximately 85 % of all air strike 
missions prior to Operation Anaconda.   ST was responsible for 100% of the 21 tactical 
airfield surveys ensuring airlift support could safely operate inside the region.  ST 
controlled 15 critical aerodromes in 3 countries throughout the region.  The ATC services 
provided to over 8,000 sorties included the first ever combat employment of the Mobile 
Microwave Landing System.  The IFR capability was extremely important to continued 
airflow into this landlocked region with little to no secure land routes.   
The ST operational requirements are embodied in its three core competencies, 
terminal control, recovery, and reconnaissance.  ST must train to meet these operational 
demands.  Although presently the Training Time Required (TTR) to meet these demands 
exceeds the Training Time Allotted (TTA), there are strategies available to deal with this 
training shortfall.  ST readiness challenges can be overcome.  With an improved 
readiness system in place ST can be more prepared to meet the operational demands of 
both the USAF and SOCOM.  ST should capitalize on its flexibility and responsiveness 
to continually evolve with the Air Force and SOCOM maintaining its niche.  ST should 
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implement a readiness system that best prepares for operational requirements, encourages 





































































APPENDIX A.  TRAINING TIME REQUIRED SPREADSHEET -CCT 
 
   
   ATC Prac  Special  
CCT EVENTS  SORTS METL class Sim Ex FTX TDY Total subtot Case 
3.2.1.  Recovery Tasks   
3.2.1.1.  Personnel Recovery    
3.2.1.1.7.  SST 33% 1/9m 5 6  
3.2.1.2. Equipment Recovery    
3.2.1.2.2. Search Dive   1/9m 8 11 17  
3.2.2.  Terminal Control   
3.2.2.1.  Assault Zone      
3.2.2.1.1. Review AFI 13-217  1/9m 3  
3.2.2.1.2.  Demolitions Practical and Academics  1/9m 8 x 13  
3.2.2.1.3. Airfield Seizures  66% 1/9m 8 8  
3.2.2.1.4. FARP  1/9m 4 5  
3.2.2.1.5. Marshalling   1/9m 3 4  
3.2.2.1.7. Conventional AZ Procedures   1/9m 2  
3.2.2.2.  ATC     
3.2.2.2.1. Anti-Hijack   1/9m .5 0.5  
3.2.2.2.2.  Aircraft Characteristics   1/9m 1  
3.2.2.2.3. BASH  1/9m .5 0.5  
3.2.2.2.4. Wake Turbulence   1/9m 1  
3.2.2.2.5.  Terminal Area Visibility   1/9m 1  
3..2.2.2.6. NORDO Academic  1/9m  1  
3.2.2.2.7  GFR Academic   1/9m 2  
3.2.2.2.8.  Aircraft Separation   1/9m 2  
3.2.2.2.9.  FAA 7110.65 Chapter 3 Review  1/9m 4  
3.2.2.2.10.  CAC Academic  1/9m 2  
3.2.2.2.11.  CAC Practical  25% 3/9m 6 6 12  
3.2.2.2.12. ATC Practical 100% 5/9m   10 10 20 82  
3.2.2.3.  Termainal Attack Control          
3.2.2.3.1.  CFF Academic  1/9m .5 4.5  
3.3.2.2.3.2.  Fire Support Annex Development  1/9m 2  
3.2.2.3.3.  ECAS/CFF Refresher  1/9m 8  
3.2.2.3.4.  Indirect Fires Refresher   1/9m 4  
3.2.2.3.5.  TAC Practical (IAW AFSOC 50-1) 25%   32 12 44 120 
3.2.2.3.5.1.  Non-Current TAC Practical  A/R    n/a n/a  
3.2.2.3.6.  Gunship CFF Practical  66% 1/9m 8 12  
3.2.2.3.7.  Helo CFF Practical  1/9m 8 10 84.5  
3.2.3.  Reconnaissance      
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3.2.3.1 Surveys     
3.2.3.1.1.  Survey Academics  1/9m   n/a  
3.2.3.1.2.  LX/HLZ/DZ/FARP Survey Practical  1/9m 26 26  
3.2.3.1.3.  AutoCAD  
1/9m 
(adv)   n/a  
3.2.3.2.  Weather     
3.2.3.2.1.  Weather Academic   1/9m 2  
3.2.3.2.2.  Limited Weather Observation   1/9m 
           
1.5 1.5  
3.2.3.3.  Special RECON       
3.2.3.3.3.  R and S Practical  33% 1/9m 16 
    
12 32 61.5  
3.2.4.1.  C4I      
3.2.4.1.1.  Communications Equipment  1/9m 2  
3.2.4.1.2.  NAVAIDS Academic   1/9m .5 4.5  
3.2.4.1.3.  Electronic Equipment (beacons/laser)  1/9m  1  
3.2.4.1.4.  Computers   1/9m 1  
3.2.4.1.5.  Portable Radio Operation   1/9m 4 8  
3.2.4.1.6.  Vehicular Radio Operations Practical   1/9m 2 3  
3.2.4.1.7.  Radar Beacons Practical   1/9m 2 4  
3.2.4.1.8.  Data Transmission Practical   1/9m 4 8  
3.2.4.1.9.  Intelligence Oversight  1/12m 1 32.5  
3.2.4.2.  Defensive Measures        
3.2.4.2.1.  SMUT Academics   1/9M 2  
3.2.4.2.1.1.  SMUT Practical 100% 1/9M 8 
      
12 20  
3.2.4.2.2. IADs Academic  1/9m 8 10  
3.2.4.2.2.1.  Live Fire IADs 100% 2/9m 16 16  
3.2.4.2.3.  Extreme Environ. Training Academics  1/9m 2  
3.2.4.2.3.1.  Ex. Envrion. Training Practical  66% 1/9m 8 8 58  
3.2.4.3.  Mission Prep         
3.2.4.3.1.  Mission Planning Academic   1/9m 4  
3.2.4.3.1.1. Full Mission Profile Practical   3/9m 48 
      
36 84  
3.2.4.3.2.  Briefing Presentation Academics  1/9m .5 1.5 89.5  
3.2.4.4.  Inflitrate/Exfiltrate       
3.2.4.4.1.  Airdrop Rigging Review Academic  1/9m 4  
3.2.4.4.2. MFF Procedures Video  1/12m .5 0.5  
3.2.4.4.2.1.  MFF EPs   1/12m 1  
3.2.4.4.3.  night Tactical S/L Practical  66%(2/9) 1/9m .5 8   12 22.5 96 
3.2.4.4.4.  Night Tactical MFF 66%(2/9) 1/9m 16   12 35 96 
3.2.4.4.5.  Night CRRC  1/9m 9 17  
3.2.4.4.6.  Tactical Overland Movement 66%(4/9) 1/9m 8 10 288 
3.2.4.4.6.1.  Road March  1/9m 2 2  
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3.2.4.4.7.  Night Equpment Fast Rope 66% 1/9m   8 8  
3.2.4.4.8.  Night Helocast 66% 1/9m 7 12  
3.2.4.4.9.  Rope/Caving Ladder  1/9m 2 2  
3.2.4.4.10.  Compass Dive  1/9m 12 18  
3.2.4.4.11.  Amphibious Operation   1/9m .5 9 14.5  
3.2.4.4.12.  Helo Duck Operation  1/18m 10 12  
3.2.4.4.13.  RAMZ 33% 1/9m 12 16 174.5  
3.2.4.4.14.  MFF (JM)  1/6m  n/a    
3.2.4.4.15.  S/L (JM)  1/6m  n/a    
3.2.4.4.16.  Fastrope/Rappel/Helocast Master  1/12m  N/a  
3.2.4.4.18.  Rappel Master   1/12m  n/a/  
3.2.4.4.19.  Helocast Master  1/12m  n/a  
3.2.4.4.20.  Tandem Master   1/12m /a  
3.2.4.4.21.  Dive Supervisior   1/12m /a  
3.2.4.5.  Deploy/Sustain/Redeploy     
3.2.4.5.1.  Hazardous Cargo Class  1/12m /a  
3.2.4.5.2.  Pallet Build-up Class  1/12m /a 600 
3.2.4.5.3.  Explosives Safety Class  1/12m /a 0  
     599.5  
Total Hours  141 16  346.5 96      0  599.5  
Hours per media   6 8 12  
Total Training Days  17.6 .667  43.31 8      0 
 
71.604  
MAF hours  141 21.3  346.5 64      0 
 
572.83  
    
    
TTR per Team  18 x 
     
573 10311  
Special Case TTR      600  
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APPENDIX B.  TRAINING TIME REQUIRED SPREADSHEET - PJ 
  Prac Special 
PJ Events  SORTS % METL class Ex FTX TDY Total  sub/tot case 
3.2.1.  Recovery Tasks   
3.2.1.1.  Personnel Recovery   
3.2.1.1.1.  DAR  1/9m 2 6 8  
3.2.1.1.3.  EPA  1/9m 2 6 8  
3.2.1.1.4.  Air Search Procedures  1/9m 4  4  
3.2.1.1.5. Hoist Extraction Stokes 66% 1/9m 2 10 12  
3.2.1.1.6.  Extrication 66% 1/9m 8 8  
3.2.1.1.7.  SST 66% 1/9m 4 4  
3.2.1.1.8.  CSAR  1/9m 8 16 24  
3.2.1.1.9.  Hight Angle Rescue  1/9m 8 24 32  100  
PJ Events      
3.2.1.2.  Equipment Recovery     
3.2.1.2.1  Ground Search   1/9m 8 16 24  
3.2.1.2.2.  Search Dive  1/9m 3 8 11   35  
3.2.1.3.  Medical    
3.2.1.3.1.  NREMT 100% 16  80 96  
3.2.1.3.2.  SIT MEDEX 100% 4/9m 4 32 36  132  
3.2.2.  Terminal Control    
3.2.2.1.  Assualt Zone    
3.2.2.1.3.  Airfield Seizures 66% 1/9m 8 8  
3.2.2.1.5.  Marshalling  1/9m 1 1  
3.2.2.1.6.  JCCP  1/9m 1 1   10  
3.2.3.3.  Special Reconn    
3.2.3.3.1.  Threat Identification   
3.2.3.3.2.  R n S Refresher/equipment   4 4  
3.2.3.3.3. R n S Practical  33% 1/9m  16 12 28   32  
3.2.4.  Enabling Tasks   
3.2.4.1. C4I   
3.2.4.1.1.  Communications Equipment  1/9m 4 4  
3.2.4.1.4.  Computers  1/9m 1 1  
3.2.4.1.5.  Portable Radio Operation  1/9m 4 4  
3.2.4.1.9.  Intelligence Oversight   1/12m 1 1   10  
3.2.4.2.  Defensive Measures    
3.2.4.1.  SMUT Academic  1/9m 2 2  
3.2.4.2.1.1.  SMUT Practical 100% 1/9m 8 12 20  
3.2.4.2.2.  IADs Academic  1/9m 2 8 10  
3.2.4.2.2.1. Live Fire IADs 100% 1/9m  8 8  
3.2.4.2.3.  Ext. Environment Traning Academic  1/9m 2 2  
3.2.4.2.3.1. Ext. Envriron. Training Practical 66% 1/9m 8 8   50  
3.2.4.3.  Mission Prep   
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3.2.4.3.1.  Mission Planning Academic  1/9m 4 4  
3.2.4.3.1.1.  Full Mission Profile Practical  3/9m 48 36 84  
3.2.4.3.2.Briefing Presentation Fund. Academics  1/9m 1 1   89  
3.2.4.4. Infiltrate/Exfiltrate    
3.2.4.4.1.  Airdrop rigging Review Academic  1/9m 4 4  
3.2.4.4.2.  MFF Procedures Video  1/12m 0.5 0.5  
3.2.4.4.2.1.  MFF EPs  1/12m 1 1  
3.2.4.4.3.  Night Tactical S/L Practical 66%(2/9) 1/9m 2.5 8 12 22.5 96 
3.2.4.4.4.  Night Tactical MFF  66%(2/9) 1/9m 7 16 12 35 96 
3.2.4.4.5.  Night CRRC   1/9m 8 7 15  
3.2.4.4.6.  Tactical Overland Movement 66%(4/9) 1/9m 2 8 10 288 
3.2.4.4.7.  Road March  1/9m  2 2  
3.2.4.4.8. Night Equipment Fast Rope 66% 1/9m 8 8  
3.2.4.4.9. Night Helocast 66% 1/9m 4 8 12  
3.2.4.4.10.  Rope/Caving Ladder   1/9m 2 2  
3.2.4.4.11. Compass Dive   1/9m 6 8 14  
3.2.4.4.12.  Amphibious Operation   1/9m 2.5 12 14.5  
3.2.4.4.13.  Helo Duck Operation   1/18m 2 10 12  
3.2.4.4.14. RAMZ 66% 1/9m 2 12 14  166.5  
3.2.4.4.15. MFF (JM)  1/6m   
3.2.4.4.16.  S/L (JM)  1/6m  
3.2.4.4.17.  Fastrope Master  1/12m  
3.2.4.4.18  Fastrope Master  1/12m  
3.2.4.4.19. Helocast Master  1/12m  
3.2.4.4.20.  Tandem Master   1/12m  
3.2.4.4.21.  Dive Supervisor  1/12m  
3.2.4.5. Deploy/Sustain/Redeploy    
3.2.4.5.1. Hazardous Cargo Class  1/12m  
3.2.4.5.2.  Pallett Build-up Class  1/12m  
3.2.4.5.3.  Explosives Safety Class  1/12m 480 
   
   
Total hours per media  138 323   84   80 624.5  
Media hours per day      8    8   12     8  
Days per media   17.25 40.38     7   10   74.63  
Total MAF Hours   138 323   56   80   597  
    624.5  
   
   
  545.5 x 18 =   9819 597 X 18 = 
      
10746 
  
               
    480 
    9819




APPENDIX C.  TTR SPREADSHEET  CCT 22 STS/21 STS 
  
   ATC Prac  Spec  
CCT EVENTS  SORTS METL  class Sim Ex FTX TDY Total sub/tot case 
3.2.1.  Recovery Tasks  
3.2.1.1.  Personnel Recovery   
3.2.1.1.7.  SST 33% 1/9m 5 6 
3.2.1.2. Equipment Recovery   
3.2.1.2.2. Search Dive   1/9m 8 11 17 
3.2.2.  Terminal Control  
3.2.2.1.  Assault Zone     
3.2.2.1.1. Review AFI 13-217  1/9m 3 
3.2.2.1.2.  Demolitions Practical and Academics  1/9m 8 x 13 
3.2.2.1.3. Airfield Seizures  66% 1/9m 8 8 
3.2.2.1.4. FARP  1/9m 4 5 
3.2.2.1.5. Marshalling   1/9m 3 4 
3.2.2.1.7. Conventional AZ Procedures   1/9m 2 
3.2.2.2.  ATC    
3.2.2.2.1. Anti-Hijack   1/9m .5 0.5 
3.2.2.2.2.  Aircraft Characteristics   1/9m 1 
3.2.2.2.3. BASH  1/9m .5 0.5 
3.2.2.2.4. Wake Turbulence   1/9m 1 
3.2.2.2.5.  Terminal Area Visibility   1/9m 1 
3..2.2.2.6. NORDO Academic  1/9m  1 
3.2.2.2.7  GFR Academic   1/9m 2 
3.2.2.2.8.  Aircraft Separation   1/9m 2 
3.2.2.2.9.  FAA 7110.65 Chapter 3 Review  1/9m 4 
3.2.2.2.10.  CAC Academic  1/9m 2 
3.2.2.2.11.  CAC Practical  25% 3/9m 6 6 12 
3.2.2.2.12. ATC Practical 100% 5/9m   10 10 20 82 
3.2.2.3.  Termainal Attack Control         
3.2.2.3.1.  CFF Academic  1/9m .5 4.5 
3.3.2.2.3.2.  Fire Support Annex Development  1/9m 2 
3.2.2.3.3.  ECAS/CFF Refresher  1/9m 8 
3.2.2.3.4.  Indirect Fires Refresher   1/9m 4 
3.2.2.3.5.  TAC Practical (IAW AFSOC 50-1) 25%   8   40 48 200 
3.2.2.3.5.1.  Non-Current TAC Practical  A/R    n/a n/a 
3.2.2.3.6.  Gunship CFF Practical  66% 1/9m   8  40 48 
3.2.2.3.7.  Helo CFF Practical  1/9m   114.5 
3.2.3.  Reconnaissance     
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3.2.3.1 Surveys    
3.2.3.1.1.  Survey Academics  1/9m   n/a 
3.2.3.1.2.  LX/HLZ/DZ/FARP Survey Practical  1/9m 26 26 
3.2.3.1.3.  AutoCAD  
1/9m 
(adv)   n/a 
3.2.3.2.  Weather    
3.2.3.2.1.  Weather Academic   1/9m 2 
3.2.3.2.2.  Limited Weather Observation   1/9m 
           
1.5 1.5 
3.2.3.3.  Special RECON      
3.2.3.3.3.  R and S Practical  33% 1/9m 16 
    
12 32 61.5 
3.2.4.1.  C4I     
3.2.4.1.1.  Communications Equipment  1/9m 2 
3.2.4.1.2.  NAVAIDS Academic   1/9m .5 4.5 
3.2.4.1.3.  Electronic Equipment (beacons/laser)  1/9m  1 
3.2.4.1.4.  Computers   1/9m 1 
3.2.4.1.5.  Portable Radio Operation   1/9m 4 8 
3.2.4.1.6.  Vehicular Radio Operations Practical   1/9m 2 3 
3.2.4.1.7.  Radar Beacons Practical   1/9m 2 4 
3.2.4.1.8.  Data Transmission Practical   1/9m 4 8 
3.2.4.1.9.  Intelligence Oversight  1/12m 1 32.5 
3.2.4.2.  Defensive Measures       
3.2.4.2.1.  SMUT Academics   1/9M 2 
3.2.4.2.1.1.  SMUT Practical 100% 1/9M 8 
      
12 20 
3.2.4.2.2. IADs Academic  1/9m 8 10 
3.2.4.2.2.1.  Live Fire IADs 100% 2/9m 16 16 
3.2.4.2.3.  Extreme Environ. Training Academics  1/9m 2 
3.2.4.2.3.1.  Ex. Envrion. Training Practical  66% 1/9m 8 8 58 
3.2.4.3.  Mission Prep        
3.2.4.3.1.  Mission Planning Academic   1/9m 4 
3.2.4.3.1.1. Full Mission Profile Practical   3/9m 48 
      
36 84 
3.2.4.3.2.  Briefing Presentation Academics  1/9m .5 1.5 89.5 
3.2.4.4.  Inflitrate/Exfiltrate      
3.2.4.4.1.  Airdrop Rigging Review Academic  1/9m 4 
3.2.4.4.2. MFF Procedures Video  1/12m .5 0.5 
3.2.4.4.2.1.  MFF EPs   1/12m 1 
3.2.4.4.3.  night Tactical S/L Practical  66%(2/9) 1/9m .5 8   12 22.5 96 
3.2.4.4.4.  Night Tactical MFF 66%(2/9) 1/9m 16   12 35 96 
3.2.4.4.5.  Night CRRC  1/9m 9 17 
3.2.4.4.6.  Tactical Overland Movement 66%(4/9) 1/9m 8 10 288 
3.2.4.4.6.1.  Road March  1/9m 2 2 
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3.2.4.4.7.  Night Equpment Fast Rope 66% 1/9m   8 8 
3.2.4.4.8.  Night Helocast 66% 1/9m 7 12 
3.2.4.4.9.  Rope/Caving Ladder  1/9m 2 2 
3.2.4.4.10.  Compass Dive  1/9m 12 18 
3.2.4.4.11.  Amphibious Operation   1/9m .5 9 14.5 
3.2.4.4.12.  Helo Duck Operation  1/18m 10 12 
3.2.4.4.13.  RAMZ 33% 1/9m 12 16 174.5 
3.2.4.4.14.  MFF (JM)  1/6m  n/a   
3.2.4.4.15.  S/L (JM)  1/6m  n/a   
3.2.4.4.16.  Fastrope/Rappel/Helocast Master  1/12m  N/a 
3.2.4.4.18.  Rappel Master   1/12m  n/a/ 
3.2.4.4.19.  Helocast Master  1/12m  n/a 
3.2.4.4.20.  Tandem Master   1/12m /a 
3.2.4.4.21.  Dive Supervisior   1/12m /a 
3.2.4.5.  Deploy/Sustain/Redeploy    
3.2.4.5.1.  Hazardous Cargo Class  1/12m /a 
3.2.4.5.2.  Pallet Build-up Class  1/12m /a 680 
3.2.4.5.3.  Explosives Safety Class  1/12m /a 0 
     629.5 
Total Hours  151 16  298.5 84 
        
 80  629.5 
Hours per media   8 6 8 12    8 
Total Training Days  8.9 2.667  3731 7    10 
 
75.854 
MAF hours  151 21.3  298.5 56   80
 
606.83 
   
   
TTR per Team  18 x 
     
607 10926 
Special Case TTR      680 
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APPENDIX D.  TTR PARARESCUEMAN NON NREMT YEARS 
  Prac Special 
PJ Events  SORTS % METL class Ex FTX TDY Total  sub/tot case 
3.2.1.  Recovery Tasks   
3.2.1.1.  Personnel Recovery   
3.2.1.1.1.  DAR  1/9m 2 6 8  
3.2.1.1.3.  EPA  1/9m 2 6 8  
3.2.1.1.4.  Air Search Procedures  1/9m 4  4  
3.2.1.1.5. Hoist Extraction Stokes 66% 1/9m 2 10 12  
3.2.1.1.6.  Extrication 66% 1/9m 8 8  
3.2.1.1.7.  SST 66% 1/9m 4 4  
3.2.1.1.8.  CSAR  1/9m 8 16 24  
3.2.1.1.9.  Hight Angle Rescue  1/9m 8 24 32  100  
PJ Events      
3.2.1.2.  Equipment Recovery     
3.2.1.2.1  Ground Search   1/9m 8 16 24  
3.2.1.2.2.  Search Dive  1/9m 3 8 11   35  
3.2.1.3.  Medical    
3.2.1.3.1.  NREMT 100%      
3.2.1.3.2.  SIT MEDEX 100% 4/9m 4 32 36  132  
3.2.2.  Terminal Control    
3.2.2.1.  Assualt Zone    
3.2.2.1.3.  Airfield Seizures 66% 1/9m 8 8  
3.2.2.1.5.  Marshalling  1/9m 1 1  
3.2.2.1.6.  JCCP  1/9m 1 1   10  
3.2.3.3.  Special Reconn    
3.2.3.3.1.  Threat Identification   
3.2.3.3.2.  R n S Refresher/equipment   4 4  
3.2.3.3.3. R n S Practical  33% 1/9m  16 12 28   32  
3.2.4.  Enabling Tasks   
3.2.4.1. C4I   
3.2.4.1.1.  Communications Equipment  1/9m 4 4  
3.2.4.1.4.  Computers  1/9m 1 1  
3.2.4.1.5.  Portable Radio Operation  1/9m 4 4  
3.2.4.1.9.  Intelligence Oversight   1/12m 1 1   10  
3.2.4.2.  Defensive Measures    
3.2.4.1.  SMUT Academic  1/9m 2 2  
3.2.4.2.1.1.  SMUT Practical 100% 1/9m 8 12 20  
3.2.4.2.2.  IADs Academic  1/9m 2 8 10  
3.2.4.2.2.1. Live Fire IADs 100% 1/9m  8 8  
3.2.4.2.3.  Ext. Environment Traning Academic  1/9m 2 2  
3.2.4.2.3.1. Ext. Envriron. Training Practical 66% 1/9m 8 8   50  
3.2.4.3.  Mission Prep   
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3.2.4.3.1.  Mission Planning Academic  1/9m 4 4  
3.2.4.3.1.1.  Full Mission Profile Practical  3/9m 48 36 84  
3.2.4.3.2.Briefing Presentation Fund. Academics  1/9m 1 1   89  
3.2.4.4. Infiltrate/Exfiltrate    
3.2.4.4.1.  Airdrop rigging Review Academic  1/9m 4 4  
3.2.4.4.2.  MFF Procedures Video  1/12m 0.5 0.5  
3.2.4.4.2.1.  MFF EPs  1/12m 1 1  
3.2.4.4.3.  Night Tactical S/L Practical 66%(2/9) 1/9m 2.5 8 12 22.5 96 
3.2.4.4.4.  Night Tactical MFF  66%(2/9) 1/9m 7 16 12 35 96 
3.2.4.4.5.  Night CRRC   1/9m 8 7 15  
3.2.4.4.6.  Tactical Overland Movement 66%(4/9) 1/9m 2 8 10 288 
3.2.4.4.7.  Road March  1/9m  2 2  
3.2.4.4.8. Night Equipment Fast Rope 66% 1/9m 8 8  
3.2.4.4.9. Night Helocast 66% 1/9m 4 8 12  
3.2.4.4.10.  Rope/Caving Ladder   1/9m 2 2  
3.2.4.4.11. Compass Dive   1/9m 6 8 14  
3.2.4.4.12.  Amphibious Operation   1/9m 2.5 12 14.5  
3.2.4.4.13.  Helo Duck Operation   1/18m 2 10 12  
3.2.4.4.14. RAMZ 66% 1/9m 2 12 14  166.5  
3.2.4.4.15. MFF (JM)  1/6m   
3.2.4.4.16.  S/L (JM)  1/6m  
3.2.4.4.17.  Fastrope Master  1/12m  
3.2.4.4.18  Fastrope Master  1/12m  
3.2.4.4.19. Helocast Master  1/12m  
3.2.4.4.20.  Tandem Master   1/12m  
3.2.4.4.21.  Dive Supervisor  1/12m  
3.2.4.5. Deploy/Sustain/Redeploy    
3.2.4.5.1. Hazardous Cargo Class  1/12m  
3.2.4.5.2.  Pallett Build-up Class  1/12m  
3.2.4.5.3.  Explosives Safety Class  1/12m 480 
   
   
Total hours per media  122 323   84  528.5  
Media hours per day      8    8   12   
Days per media   15.25 40.38     7    62.63  
Total MAF Hours   122 323   56    501  
    528.5  
   
   
  545.5 x 18 =   9819 501 X 18 =       9018 
  
               
        480 
    9819       9498 
 
69 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
AFDD 2-7. 2001.  Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7:  Special Operations.  Retrieved  
from the World Wide Web: https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Library/Hierarchy.asp 
AFI 13-102. 1996.  Air Force Instruction  13-102.  Air Support Operations Center  
(ASOC) and Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) Training and Evaluation  
Procedures. Retrieved from the World Wide Web February 15, 2002:   
http://www2.acc.af.mil/3asog/Doonline/staneval/13-102.pdf 
AFSOCI 36-2204.  2001.  Special Tactics Operator Training.  Hurlburt AF, FL:  720  
Special Tactics Group. 
Albert, R., Williams, W., Cook, C.  1999.  Principles for Determining the Air Force  
Active/Reserve Mix.  Santa Monica, CA: RAND.    
Dahlman, C. and Thaler, D.  2000.  Assessing Unit Readiness:  Case Study of an Air  
Force Fighter Wing.  Santa Monica, CA:   RAND 
Executive Summary.  2001.  720 STG Strategic Planning Workshop. Hurlburt AF, FL:   
720 Special Tactics Group. 
FM 25-100.  1988.  Training the Force. http://usasma.bliss.army.mil/pubs/FM_25-     
100/PDF/ch2.pdf  
FM 25-101.  1990.  Battle Focused Training. Retrieved from the World Wide Web:   
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/25-101/fm25101.htm 
Hill, K.  “An organizational Anlysis of the United States Air Force Personnel Center  
(AFPC) Airman Assignment Management System (AMS).  Monterey, CA 2001 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
Hutton, H.  2002.  Personal Interview.  April 31, 2002. 
Joint Publication1-02. "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."  
Retrieved from the World Wide Web:  http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/    
JFSC Publication 1.  The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide.  2000.  National Defense  
University.  Joint Forces Staff College.  Norfolk, Virginia.  
JFSC Pub 1.  2000.   The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide.  Available online at   
www.dtc.mil/doctinre/jel.  Norfolk, Virginia:  National Defense University.     
MAF.  1996.  “Military Man-Hour Availability Factors Update”.  Randolph AFB, TX:   
70 
Programs Research and Analysis and Engineering Division , Air Force 
Management  
Engineering Agency.  Retrieved October 18, 2001 from the World Wide Web:  
http://afmpc 
Oeser, J.  1998.  Memorandum for Record. 17 March 1998.  “Special Tactics Tasking  
Allocation System.”  Hurlburt AF, FL:  HQ AFSOC.   
Oniel, P.  2002.  Personal Interview April 3, 2002. NCOIC.   
Rescue Mission Report.  1980.  Washington D.C.:  The Library Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace.   
Reengineering Special Tactics.  Retrieved January 2002 from the World Wide Web:   
http://www.afmia.randolph.af.mil/monnews/mo%20new.pdf. 
Report by the Working Group on Combat Control Peacetime Workload.  1996.  
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois:  Department of the Air Force Headquarters Military 
Airlift Command. 
Schank, J.  1997.  Relating Resources to Personnel Readiness:  Use of Army Strength  
Management Models.  Santa Monica, CA:  RAND.  
Scott, S.  2002.  Personal Interview.  March 31,  2002.   
SORTS Designated Operational Capability Statement.  2001. Special Tactics Operation- 
Mobility.  Hurlburt AF, FL:  720 Special Tactics Group.   
Special Tactics Mission Analysis. 2001.   720 Special Tactics Group Strategic Plan.  
Hurlburt AF, FL: 720 Special Tactics Group. 
Strategic Planning Process.  2001.  The Strategic Planning Process: 720 STG Strategic  
Planning Workshop.  Hurlburt AF, FL:  720 Special Tactics Group.   
TSRA.  2001.  Training System Requirements Analysis:  Special Tactics Advanced Skills  
Training.  Hurlburt AF, FL: B3H Corporation. 
71 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Gordon McCormick 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
4. David Tucker 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
5. Jennifer Duncan  
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
